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The project builds extensively on the theoretical foundations of Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis. A Minskian framework is integrated with both behavioral and human rights theory. 
The goal is to develop a more holistic view of market dynamics which includes psychological 
and human rights considerations. In developing this framework, we establish an indicator that 
can be used to track fragility at the sector and firm levels. This work can be applied to 
macroprudential policy to more adequately equip regulators whose responsibility it is to tame 
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Hyman Minsky was considered an 'obscure' economist for nearly all his academic life. A 
student of Schumpeter, Minsky trained at Harvard in the classical tradition. As he developed 
his own academic foundations, however, Minsky becomes a Keynesian. Minsky built on 
Keynes' investment theory of the business cycle to establish a financial theory of investment. 
His early work focuses on the relationships between financial institutions and economic 
performance developed into a broader focus on the business cycle, which culminated with the 
Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), his most salient contribution (Whalen, 2012). Minsky 
uses his FIH to argue that financial fragility is endogenous in the development of a capitalist 
system. Minsky rejects the foundational assumptions made by the classical and neoclassical 
schools, which excludes him from mainstream debate. 
The Great Recession brought Minsky from the fringes of economic thought. In mid-
2007, with the global economy in the throes of financial meltdown, Minsky's theories were 
injected into the mainstream media and have persisted since (Lahart, 2007; Cassidy, 2008; 
Norris, 2013; The Economist, 2016). The FIH has also been used extensively in the academic 
literature to discuss the 2008 financial crisis (Davidson, 2008; Palley, 2009; Wray, 2011; 
Bellofiore and Halevi, 2011). Much of the debate in the academic literature attempts to define 
a 'Minsky Moment,' which is an inevitable contraction that the capitalist system. It is important 
to remember, however, that Minsky focuses more directly on the processes that lead up to a 





This paper embraces Minsky's methodological approach to develop an indicator that 
monitors financial fragility with empirical measures of his margins of safety concept. As safety 
margins narrow, firms move into a riskier financing position. Minsky identifies three financing 
positions: hedge, speculative, and Ponzi. The indicator utilizes quarterly balance sheet and cash 
flow statement data that bank holding companies (BHCs) must report to the Federal Reserve. 
The data shows trends across a variety of measures which demonstrate so-called tipping points 
into riskier financing positions (from hedge to speculative to Ponzi).  
Before the indicator is developed, however, the theoretical foundations of the FIH are 
applied to existing behavioral and human rights theory. The behavioral literature benefits from 
Minskian analysis because it necessitates a divergence from neoclassical assumptions that have 
limited psychology’s impact on macroeconomic analysis. As it currently exists, conventional 
behavioral research operates with the assumption that behavioral idiosyncrasies are irrational 
deviations from equilibrating behavior. The burgeoning field of emotional finance is 
introduced and incorporated into Minskian theory. The FIH offers an ideal methodology and 
framework to apply the psychoanalytic insights advanced in the little-known behavioral theory. 
Consider the integration of the two theories, labeled emotional-Minskian, a more holistic 
macroeconomic theory, encapsulating inevitable capitalist dynamics and the behavior that 
propels them.  
With a holistic macroeconomic theory, the paper analyzes the existing human rights 
literature as it relates to finance. The rights-finance relationship has been slow to develop 
amongst human rights scholars and is insufficient in its current form. One reason for this slow 
integration is the focus on development economies. The consensus in the human rights 





emphasizing political and social rights instead. This characterization is misguided. The US has 
a rich history of supporting and promoting economic rights, which will be acknowledged and 
developed. The Minskian tradition demonstrates the gradual shift toward financialization in 
the macroeconomy. Recognizing foundational shifts in the macroeconomy necessitates an 
innovative approach to incorporating rights.  
Another reason for slow development is the disparate language that the two bodies of 
work employ. Rights scholars construct doctrines of economic and social rights that neglect 
the impact of finance. There currently exist two main categories of rights-finance literature. 
The first, inspired by the Ruggie framework, focuses on corporate responsibility and the 
obligations of firms, typically multinational, to champion rights in the places they are 
established. The second focuses on financial relationships at the individual level. This work 
encompasses a broad range from considering credit as a human right to bankruptcy law. 
Neither of these rights-approaches elucidates the importance of finance on a macro-level. Once 
the paper justifies the relevancy of the rights-finance relationship, it will develop a macro-
rights frame. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 develops the Minskian theoretical framework 
to situate the paper within the current literature. Chapter 3 discusses the shortcomings of 
mainstream behavioral literature and introduces emotional finance. It advances an emotional-
Minskian framework to include psychology as a driver of capitalist dynamics. Chapter 4 
delineates the historical US commitment to human rights and provides the rights literature with 
a macro framework. The indicator is developed in Chapter 5 and includes suggestions for 









The focus here is on Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis and, more specifically, his 
margins of safety concept. After Minsky's method is introduced, various applications of his 
theory will be examined. The paper will then contextualize his theory in the behavioral finance 
literature to draw connections between the endogenous nature of fragility and the uncertainty 
of markets. The concluding section will introduce a macro-framework for human rights theory 
inspired by Minskian tradition. 
2.1 Minsky  
2.1.1 Minskian Approach 
Minsky's work illuminates the inherent tendency toward instability present in the capitalist 
system. The most crucial aspect in understanding the dynamics of the financial sector is 
fragility. In this paper, financial fragility is defined as the "dependence of financial positions 
on refinancing and liquidation" and financial instability will be defined as the "propensity of 
financial fragility to affect economic processes" (Tymoigne, Detecting Ponzi Finance : An 
Evolutionary Approach to the Measure of Financial Fragility, 2010). The interrelation of these 
two concepts is crucial for understanding Minskian dynamics. Fragility increases as balance 
sheets become less liquid through the accumulation of short-term assets. The financial sector 
is more prone to instability as balance sheets continually deteriorate and dealings in the 





Tymoigne (2010) draws a distinction between two conceptual approaches in defining 
fragility. The first is a static approach which, Tymoigne argues, conflates fragility and 
instability in a way that severely limits the application of the framework. Bernanke and Gertler 
(1990), for example, define a financially fragile environment as one "in which potential 
borrowers...have low wealth relative to the sizes of their projects" (p. 88). The starting point 
of the static analysis depicts a macroeconomy that is already unstable in the Minskian 
definition. The static approaches' most evident conceptual shortcoming is its assumption that 
increased assets on the balance sheet of potential borrowers signals financial health. Fragility 
builds in times of economic growth and ultimately produces instability.  
Tymoigne introduces the evolutionary approach, built on Minskian foundations. 
Minsky argues that during tranquil years, lenders become more comfortable with borrowers' 
past repayment history and are confident about future cash flows because of economic growth 
that skews lenders' perspectives (Minsky, 1980). This is the essence of the evolutionary 
approach. It attempts to identify increasing fragility to alert policymakers to the possibility of 
crisis before it happens. Instead of trying to forecast a 'Minsky Moment,' where an economy is 
already unstable, the evolutionary approach maintains the importance of monitoring balance 
sheets to ensure that fragility does not go unrecognized. 
Minsky, in establishing the foundations of the evolutionary approach, is intensely 
critical of neoclassical assumptions. Extending Keynes' analysis, he studies the economy as a 
financial economy. The Minskian analysis departs dramatically from the neoclassicals in that 
it acknowledges the importance of financial relationships. There is no room for financial 
fragility in the mainstream doctrine because the economy is studied in real terms, whereas 





The FIH emphasizes the idea that instability develops from inherent fragility. 
Neoclassical theory is deficient in its "emphasis upon the interactions that make for equilibrium 
and not upon endogenous disequilibrating processes" (Minsky, 1986, p. 115). He 
acknowledges that economic units with more aggressive financing positions are susceptible to 
exogenous changes in financial markets, such as interest rate moves. The exogenous 'shocks' 
would not have such negative effects on firms, however, if the firms maintained more prudent 
financing positions. Financing decisions made by firms that create a dangerously fragile 
environment are endogenous in nature and must be approached as such. In a capitalist system, 
"units have to take positions" on future debt commitments "in an uncertain world," which will 
eventually lead to human error and miscalculation (Minsky, 1980a, p. 515). The FIH, unlike 
neoclassical theory, can be applied to any capitalist system with complex financial 
arrangements. 
This paper lies firmly in the evolutionary approach. The rest of the theoretical 
framework will center on the work that has grown from Minskian foundations. The theoretical 
framework will also demonstrate where this paper fits into the Minskian tradition. Minsky’s 
two approaches to economic analysis will be distinguished in the next few sub-sections. The 
first approach delineates an arc of capitalism, explicating capitalist phases across different eras 
and examining institutional evolution. His second approach is focused on periodic instability 
that is identifiable in every historical stage of capitalism. 
2.2 Phases of Capitalism and Institutional Change 
2.2.1 Phases of Capitalism 
Minsky hoped that his assessment of capitalism would shift mainstream economic thought 





institutions that can prevent financial collapse and any analysis that excludes them "'throws no 
appreciable light on real world economies" (Papdimitriou & Wray, 1998, p. 208). Institutional 
presence is the first major distinction between pre- and post-World War II varieties of 
capitalism. The impositions made by institutions on the post-war economy prevented the debt 
deflation process that was inevitable in the pre-WWII laissez-faire era. 
Minsky primarily focuses on the financial structures of a particular economic 
environment. The two main eras of capitalism are commercial capitalism1 and money-manager 
capitalism2 with three broader financial stages: industrial, financial, and managerial (Minsky 
& Whalen, 1997). The pre-WWII industrial finance stage, with its proliferation of resource 
dependent projects like railroads and factories, created demand for more complex finance 
arrangements. As the financial stage evolved without institutional oversight, financial fragility 
dramatically increased and led to the Great Depression. Managerial finance grew with the 
development of regulatory institutions established by the New Deal. As the managerial 
financing structure took shape, money-manager3 capitalism emerged. The tendency of actors 
to engage in increasingly speculative endeavors this marks this most recent era of capitalism 
(Minsky & Whalen, 1997). 
Money-manager capitalism relies heavily on financial arrangements that require 
"expensive, long-lived capital assets," which necessitates institutions that can constrain 
instability (Papdimitriou & Wray, 1998, p. 210). It is evident that private institutional structures 
which respond to changes in profit-seeking activity shapes capitalist development (Whalen, 
                                                          
1 External finance used primarily to finance production or transportation of goods.  
2 Financial markets and arrangements are dominated by institutional investors. 
3 Money-manager capitalism is understood to be a concentration business at the corporate level, a concentration 
of financial assets on the books of financial intermediaries, and attention to money-manager performance which 





2012). Ideally, regulatory institutions would be established with the ability to actively monitor 
adequate safety margins as opposed to reacting to adverse conditions after margins wear thin. 
Unfortunately, however, deregulation, lengthy periods without depression, and historical 
government intervention have reduced the perceptions of risk and gradually fostered a fragile 
environment (Wray, 2011). The era of money-manager capitalism has been accompanied by 
staggering developments in the financial sector which has escalated fragility.  
One of the most compelling developments of the contemporary financial sector is 
consolidation. This paper will reexamine Minsky's financial sector analysis in this era of 
unprecedented financial sector consolidation. Figure 1 shows that the number of total banking 
institutions has fallen dramatically since the late-1980s, as total assets in the financial sector 
have increased dramatically. This figure suggests that fewer financial institutions yield more 
influence in the broader financial sector. As fragility increases among fewer institutions, it can 
permeate easily throughout the sector. It is argued here that the substantial consolidation of 
market power leaves the financial sector, and thus the broader economy, more vulnerable to 
shifts in market sentiment.  





The paper will show that sector concentration increases sector fragility because with 
fewer firms, the financing positions of the largest firms weigh considerably more on the health 
of the sector than in a more diffuse sector. The Minskian framework suggests that the current 
finance structure of money-manager capitalism is a crucial aspect of the broader 
macroeconomy. If the financial sector becomes unstable, it could very well jeopardize other 
parts of the economy. The United States, with other developed economies, may be transitioning 
into a new era of economic structure, evidenced by increasing concentration of market power 
that further alters the foundations of the finance markets.  
2.2.2 Historical Analysis 
Before we apply a Minskian lens to the financial sector in an era of consolidation, we will 
examine existing applications of the FIH to previous financial crises. It is important to 
contextualize this work to see the evolution of economies in a Minskian framework. Isenberg 
(1988), for example, applies the theory to the Great Depression time-period to examine 
whether the FIH can explain the most detrimental economic crash in modern history. The 
author uses contemporaneous financial data to calculate the financing positions of firms in the 
1920s.4 At the end of her paper, Isenberg concludes that "the story of debt that emerges from 
this historical period portrays a somewhat different picture than that hypothesized by Minsky" 
citing, among other things, matching terms of debt maturity and relatively low debt-equity 
ratios (Isenberg, 1988, p. 1055) 
                                                          
4 It is useful to include here the formulas that Isenberg uses in her analysis. She categorizes the stage of finance 
for a given unit where AQ = anticipated quasi-rent from gross profit, PC = contracted debt service, AQi(y) = 
income portion of quasi-rents, and PCi(y) = income (interest) portion of loan. A unit is considered to be in 
hedge if AQi > PCi (i=1,…,n); speculative if AQi < PCi (i=1,…,m is small), AQi > PCi (i=m+1,…,n), and 
AQi(y) > PCi(y) (i=1,…,m); and Ponzi if AQi < PCi (i=1,…,n-1),  AQi >> PCi (i=n), AQi(y) < PCi(y)(i=n,…,n-





One plausible reason for Isenberg's conclusion is that the economy had not yet 
transitioned into the stage of money-manager capitalism. Minsky acknowledges capitalism as 
an evolving system, which sees institutions reorganize based on profit opportunity. He "used 
to say that there are as many varieties of capitalism as Heinz has pickles" (Minsky, 1991, p. 
10). The pre-WWII, Great Depression era is characterized as laissez-faire capitalism, which 
somewhat limits Isenberg's analysis. As discussed above, the financing structures of the pre- 
and post-war economies were very different. 
The first significant instance of a post-war financial crisis is the Credit Crunch of 1966. 
Wray (1999) argues that the crisis can, indeed, be analyzed in the context of Minsky’s FIH. 
Before explicitly connecting the Credit Crunch to the FIH, Wray defines the mechanics of a 
bank’s liabilities (deposits), horizontal leveraging, and high-powered money, which build the 
foundation for an increasingly complex financial system. Wray argues that the ‘robust’5 post-
war financial environment is Minskian because financial innovation allowed for increased 
leverage ratios without increasing reserves. As threats to banks’ profit margins and the 
uncertainty of interest rates increased, financial institutions pulled out of the government bond 
market, which required the Fed to intervene as lender-of-last-resort. While a “minor speed 
bump on the road to Minskian fragility,” the Credit Crunch created an incredibly precarious 
environment (Wray, 1999, p. 425). Scholars utilize the FIH to explain more recent crises as 
the complexity of the modern financial system intensifies.   
Kregel (1998), for example, explains the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 using the FIH. 
His analysis connects Minskian theory to the qualitative financial and political relationships in 
Asia at the time as opposed to Isenberg's data-driven approach. The confluence of both 
                                                          
5 A robust environment can be understood as a relatively stable financial environment with conservative 





endogenous factors – tendency toward Ponzi finance – and exogenous factors – change in 
interest and exchange rates – lead to a debt deflation process, which Kregel identifies as 
Minskian in nature (Kregel, 1998). In terms of recovery, Kregel sees the IMF's treatment of 
the Crisis as inadequate and argues that it was a stock problem, where "firms and banks tried 
to liquidate their stocks of goods and assets to liquidate their foreign exchange debts" (Kregel, 
1998, p. 14). This distinction is important in that it helps one distinguish between a debt crisis 
and a debt deflation process. 
As discussed in the Introduction, there has been a proliferation of Minskian analysis 
following the Great Recession. A separate catalog would have to be written to provide an 
appropriate survey of this literature. There is an abundance of literature in the Minskian 
tradition as well as literature from opposing schools that focus more on exogenous factors. 
Many neoclassicals, for example, argue that fragility can be attributed to the inadequate 
decisions of regulatory bodies. The conversation is complex but, again, too vast to succinctly 
encapsulate.  
2.2.3 Financial Innovation   
In every explanation of previous crisis that financial innovation is a driving factor in fragility. 
Innovation is discussed in the context of institutions and financial instruments. Institutionally, 
innovation leads to changing dynamics of firm construction. On the product level, innovation 
is evident in the evolving financial instruments produced by firms in times of increased profit-
seeking activity. As money-manager capitalism has developed, the financial sector has 
witnessed unparalleled innovation on the institutional scale in the proliferation of mega banks 





A consequence of market consolidation is the increasingly ruthless pursuit of market 
share. As banks consolidate, the largest banks jockey to maintain or improve their position 
among their behemoth peers. One of the most expedient ways to accumulate market share is 
to pioneer profitable financial instruments. Product-level financial innovation is rampant in a 
euphoric environment where market participants anticipate perpetual expansion. Under the 
condition of uncertainty, lenders must make decisions based on norms and historical 
performance, which, in a euphoric economy, will skew a borrower's ability to repay.6 Liability 
structures may become vulnerable because of innovation, making it likely that some debt 
agreements will not be met (Minsky, 1986).   
Economic euphoria paired with intense market concentration leads to an environment 
where competitors adopt the most recent innovations, disseminating the innovations 
throughout the market. As an innovation becomes normalized in the system, it has the potential 
to increase fragility. Mortgage securitization is a perfect example of an immensely profitable 
innovation that financial institutions had to engage with to maintain or increase market share 
(Lim, 2008; Kregel, 2008; Wray, 2007). In the current form of money-manager capitalism, the 
firms at the top cannot risk passing on an innovation as smaller firms try to gain market 
relevance. The indicator developed in the last section of this paper will attempt to demonstrate 
the transmission of innovation through changes in liability structure. 
To keep pace with innovation, firms typically increase leverage in a process that 
Minsky calls layering. Layering leaves firms vulnerable to changes in market conditions that 
may increase uncertainty and lead to instability. The vulnerability stems from the nature of the 
layers, which typically take the form of collateralized short-term assets (Kregel, 2007). Balance 
                                                          
6 ‘Borrowers,’ in this usage, include lager banks that issue debt, since they are beholden to those investors who 





sheet liquidity erodes as layering accelerates and "the importance of the uninterrupted flow of 
receipts increases" because one firm's inability to make debt payments can have a very swift 
contagion effect which could trigger a debt-deflation process (Minsky, 1972). As firms engage 
in increasingly speculative activity, layering has the potential to make firms dangerously 
illiquid (Kregel, 2008; Papadimitriou & Wray, 1999). The illiquidity is typically overlooked 
and unchecked in times of expansion because the accumulation of debt is considered necessary 
for market competitiveness.  
The Minskian tradition offers crucial insights in the way that innovation inevitably 
affects liquidity at the firm and sector levels during times of stability. It indicates that financial 
innovation has shifted the financial sector's business orientation during the money-manager 
capitalism era. Banks began to adopt the "originate and distribute" financial model, commonly 
known as securitization, in the early 1970s (Cowan, 2003). Securitization is one the most 
destabilizing aspects of the new financial system. It can be classified as "market-oriented" as 
opposed to "bank-based," which means the firms that organize the financing (origination) do 
not hold the loans on their balance sheets (distribution) (Wray, 2008). Free market proponents 
argue that this process shifts risk off bank balance sheets and diversifies risk in the market. 
This mainstream attitude illuminates Minsky's assessment of complacency in the marketplace.  
It can be argued that the development of the "originate and distribute" model has 
exacerbated fragility by transforming banks' traditional functions. Securitization has brought 
with it unsustainable practice that regulators overlooked or ignored during the transformation 
process (Crotty, 2009). For example, complex financial arrangements allowed banks to 
guarantee credit worthiness without assessing a potential borrower (Wray, 2008). Untenable 





destabilization that ultimately led to the most recent devastating recession. Equipped with an 
understanding of the arc of capitalism, the next section will rigorously define Minskian 
financing regimes. Fragility stems from the development of more risky financing regimes and 
are identifiable at every capitalist stage. 
2.3 Systemic Fragility 
2.3.1 Financing Positions 
Minsky's FIH is more than institutional change and product innovation. Within each stage of 
capitalism, Minsky identifies three distinct financing stages: hedge, speculative and 'Ponzi' 
finance. Each stage of finance situates an economic unit's cash commitments and liabilities. As 
firms (sectors) transition from one stage to another (hedge to speculative and speculative to 
Ponzi) their balance sheets become more illiquid and the firm (sector) becomes more 
vulnerable to changes in economic conditions.  
 A unit that is hedge financed expects to meet all its cash commitments with the cash 
flow from its capital assets. In the states of speculative and Ponzi finance, however, an 
economic unit is not expected to meet some or most of its cash commitments over a short-term 
period. Ponzi financed units expect debt burdens to rise (Minsky, 1986). A financing position 
can be identified in a firm's margin of safety. The narrower the margin, the more aggressive 
the position and the more unprepared a firm is to combat a debt deflation process. 
2.3.2 Margins of Safety and Debt Deflation 
One of Minsky's most important contributions is his "margins of safety" concept. These 
margins can be understood as an economic unit's excess of cash flows needed to meet 
contractual liabilities. Minsky identifies three margins: cash in portfolios, excess of cash 





1977).7 Financial fragility becomes more dangerous as margins of safety erode. Erosion of 
safety margins represents decreasing available liquidity. Thin margins increase fragility 
because reactions to poor news may become increasingly erratic as firms realize that their 
safety margins are inadequate (Kregel, 2008). The financial economy is destabilized by the 
ordering of debt repayment when debtors do not have sufficient margins to meet commitments.  
Margins of safety are crucial to financial stability because a firm that is in a hedge 
finance position with sufficient margins of safety can meet its obligations in the case of an 
adverse market move. Minsky makes it clear that as capitalism has evolved throughout history, 
firms have been incentivized to decrease their safety margins to remain competitive. This is 
glaringly true in the contemporary financial landscape. Financial innovation has the tendency 
to narrow safety margins, which increases the likelihood of a debt deflation process. This paper 
will examine Minsky's analysis of capitalism's evolution and emphasize the margins of safety 
concept throughout. 
As we have seen, Minskian theory outlines an evolutionary process of fragility that 
results in full-blown instability. The most dangerous manifestation of financial instability is a 
debt deflation spiral. Minsky relies heavily on Fisher's theory of debt deflation, – an 
environment where debts increase and prices fall – particularly in the case of prolonged periods 
of sustained growth that lead to fragility (Minsky, 1986). Minsky's FIH explains the origins of 
a debt deflation process and suggests a policy framework to prevent 'It' from happening again. 
                                                          
7 Wray (2010) elaborates more on this definition. He maintains that all economic units must take financial 
positions while maintaining safety margins. Minsky's 'cash in portfolio' margin can be seen in balance sheets as 
asset liquidity. The more liquid the balance sheet, the larger the margin of safety. The 'excess of cash receipts 
margin' is essentially the expected net income generated by asset ownership. Finally, the 'present value' margin 
is net worth for a given expected income stream. The safety margins increase as the value of assets increases 





It is important to understand margins of safety in the context of a debt deflation cycle to fully 
grasp the theory. 
One of the most important aspects of Minsky’s theory is his assertion that lender-of-
last-resort institutions, like the Federal Reserve, play a crucial role in preventing full-blown 
debt deflation. Preventing debt deflation, however, sets “a groundwork for a subsequent burst 
of expansion followed by inflation” that leaves the economy vulnerable to another cycle of 
fragility (Minsky, 1986, p. 281). As previously discussed, expansion leads to complacency and 
competitiveness that shaves banks’ safety margins. Narrow margins of safety make it difficult 
for institutions to absorb losses, which predictably set the stage for a debt deflation spiral.   
Another important concept that connects to margins of safety is the role financial 
institutions take in the transformation of the maturity of financial assets. As a financial 
institution attempts to match lenders to borrowers, it exposes itself to maturity mismatches that 
arise from difference term preferences (Kregel, 2007). It is assumed that lenders (savers) prefer 
more liquid short-term assets and borrowers (investors) prefer longer-term liabilities. These 
alternative preferences mean that bankers must get creative in the transformation process, 
which often means adjusting liquidity preferences. Institutions can issue short-term liabilities 
against longer-term assets, which makes the bank’s balance sheet more illiquid and narrows 
safety margins (Kregel, 2007) 
In the normal capitalist process, margins of safety decrease as financial institutions get 
more comfortable lending against riskier assets that are perceived to be safe (Kregel, 2007). 
The current regulatory framework misses this building fragility and intervenes as firms cannot 
protect themselves against debt deflation. Our indicator will focus on the three margins of 





It is crucial to understand fluid sensitivities to exogenous changes. An institution with 
an aggressively illiquid balance sheet will be more sensitive to changes in the short-term 
interest rate, for example. Interest rate sensitivity relates to safety margins because a rate 
surprise, among other surprises, may create a situation where a bank is too illiquid to meet its 
obligations. In the regulatory framework that Minsky describes, the lender-of-last-resort 
intervenes as banks realize that their balance sheets are too illiquid. Instead, a monitoring 
process using the margins of safety concept, should be utilized to detect firms that would be 
unable to protect against debt deflation. 
2.4 The Task at Hand 
The paper will now be situated in the existing theoretical framework. First, we will show 
attempts at modeling fragility. Second, we will introduce behavioral economic theory to 
connect Keynesian uncertainty and Minsky’s theory of financial investment more explicitly. 
In the concluding sub-section, we will return to the Minsky's institutional analysis and 
introduce a macro-human rights framework that should be considered when developing policy. 
2.4.1 Previous Modeling  
Opposed to the historical analysis, the authors who focus on modeling the FIH use Minsky's 
theoretical framework to develop either mathematical models or indices to act as indicators 
that signal increased financial fragility. There are two authors, Keen (1995, 2007, 2013) and 
Tymoigne (2010, 2011), who have attempted to model Minsky's FIH most rigorously. Keen's 
papers amend an existing model to include a financial fragility framework and Tymoigne 
develops indexes on the macro level. 
In his first attempt at modeling the FIH, Keen introduces a real finance sector and 





with results that align with Minsky's hypothesis. Particularly important in the simulation is 
evidence that a strong government is necessary to mitigate fragility. The model also 
demonstrates the rise in financial sector earnings, the stabilization of non-financial business 
incomes, and the fall in worker income, which allowed for a prediction of the most recent 
financial crisis (Keen, 2007).   
In 2013, Keen added a monetary element to his macroeconomic model as an extension 
of his real qualitative model. It is, like his first attempt, a very mathematical approach, which 
gives results that "are more extreme than our actual economic situation" (Keen, 2013, p. 225). 
Despite the extreme results, the model does provide important insights on the role of 
government spending and the heroic nature of many mainstream assumptions. In both 1995 
and 2013, Keen rejects Minsky's own method of utilizing the multiplier-accelerator model as 
a foundation for modeling fragility (Keen, 2013). While Keen's approach seems to yield more 
compelling results than Minsky's modeling attempts, it is still somewhat unsatisfactory. 
Tymoigne takes a different approach from Keen and attempts to develop indexes that 
act as fragility indicators. His first attempt at an index is focused on detecting Ponzi finance in 
the household sector. He calculates aggregate household cash flows to develop an index that 
depends on the growth of home prices and household debt (Tymoigne, 2010). The paper uses 
the evolutionary approach discussed above and illustrates the tendency of capitalist economies 
to become increasingly fragile. 
In 2011, Tymoigne expands on his first paper and develops a fragility index that can 
be applied to the household, non-financial nonfarm, and financial business sectors. This index 
is weighted by attempting to "figure out which of the variables is able to more accurately 





interpretations and a level of arbitrariness (Tymoigne, 2011, p. 12). Tymoigne's index 
construction is certainly useful in developing the theoretical macro framework, but it is unable 
to narrow in on the sources of fragility in a particular sector as fragility builds. Both Tymoigne 
and Keen, in their attempts at modeling Minsky's FIH, emphasize that the first step in adopting 
a new economic model is rejecting the assumptions that are evident in mainstream thought.   
There are other models in the Minskian tradition that focus on institutional dynamics. 
The indicator developed in this paper will focus more narrowly on identifying FIH financing 
cycles, but the models of institutional change help to contextualize changing financing 
positions. Nasica & Raybaut (2005), for example, introduce a measure of fiscal policy to 
identify stability. They focus on the role of regulatory institutions and conclude that the 
economy is most stable when the countercyclical deficit constraint is sufficiently flexible. 
Similarly, Kapeller & Schutz (2014) introduce institutional dynamics in a stock-flow 
consistent model to illustrate Minsky-Veblen cycles. The authors pull from Veblen, Minsky, 
and Keynes to formulate a model based in institutionalist theory. They argue that as income 
inequality increases, demand for consumer credit increases, which breeds Minskian fragility 
(Kapeller & Schutz, 2014). The institutionalist connection is insightful because it demonstrates 
further the inevitability of fragility in a capitalist economy.  
There are also models that seek to identify fragility but do not fit as well in the FIH 
framework, including (Goodhart, Sunirand, & Tsomocos, 2006). This model may be more 
aligned with the ‘textbook Keynesian’ tradition with its acceptance of rational agents and 
homogeneous preferences. The model is mathematical and attempts to find identify fragility 
on the aggregate level by measuring household and nonfinancial business defaults. The authors 





portfolio preferences. An important aspect of the paper is the acknowledgement that a specific 
equilibrium – Monetary Equilibrium with Defaults and Commercial Banks (MEDCB) - can 
exist where “default and financial instability manifest themselves as equilibrium phenomena 
entirely consistent with the proper functioning of markets” (Goodhart, Sunirand, & Tsomocos, 
2006, p. 125). The mathematical processes explained in the paper are outside the scope of this 
section, but the theoretical implications are important. 
While the model is mathematically rigorous, we do not agree with some of the 
assumptions made and, most importantly, do not agree with the definition of financial fragility. 
Goodhart et al. considers fragility as the point at which a substantial proportion of economic 
agents default on debt obligations which decreases profitability in the banking sector 
(Goodhart, Sunirand, & Tsomocos, 2006). This does not fit in the evolutionary framework that 
Minsky proposes and misappropriates the fragility language. The model’s examination of 
contagion could potentially be useful for this paper if the authors adopted an evolutionary 
framework where fragility increases with financial innovation and the acceptance of innovation 
by competitors in the financial sector. 
Despite the Goodhart example, there are models that may fit into a Minskian analysis 
without an explicit connection. Gennaioli et al. (2012) develop a model of financial innovation 
that is more aligned with our theoretical framework. The main thrust behind the model is that 
investors desire investments with safe cash flows and that as the demand for (and price of) 
these investments increases, financial intermediaries are incentivized to innovate. Financial 
institutions then present the innovations to investors as instruments that are safe, which leaves 
investors and institutions vulnerable to risks with low probabilities. The safer these assets are 





susceptibility to changes in the broader economy. This view of innovation fits in our theory 
because it assumes that financial institutions must innovate to remain competitive. When 
innovation happens in the context of market tranquility as investors are seeking safe assets, 
fragility becomes increasingly inevitable. 
Our approach is in this Minskian tradition as it rejects the notion of efficient markets 
and instead recognizes the endogenous nature of fragility. We will use public information 
filings to identify the sources of growing fragility more precisely as it develops.  The financial 
sector is a perfect vehicle for this analysis because it is very concentrated. The intense 
competition requires that sector participants adopt the new instruments to maintain market 
share. The level of concentration in the sector is important because one firm's financing 
decisions could easily make the sector more vulnerable to changes in market perception. 
Before we develop the model further, we will briefly discuss the behavioral aspects that will 
allow us to explain fragility more thoroughly. 
2.4.2 Linking Psychology  
Our model hopes to offer realistic applications with the inclusion of behavioral theory. Minsky 
builds extensively on Keynes' theories of market psychology. The financial market, like the 
broader macroeconomy, is a social system that depends on decisions of people involved in 
financial processes. The inevitability of overconfidence and complacency are among the most 
crucial aspects of inherent instability that makes the capitalist system cyclically vulnerable to 
paralyzing crisis.  
Despite the importance of psychology in Minsky there is not much written that directly 
connects Minsky's fragility framework and the tenets of contemporary behavioral economics. 
This paper will use various behavioral theories to explain the endogenous nature of fragility 





insights in the behavioral economics literature are cognitive dissonance; over-confidence, 
under-reaction; irrelevance of history; and under saving. These theories have mostly been 
applied on the individual consumer level. Firm decision-making, especially firms in an 
increasingly concentrated sector that jockey for market share, can be analyzed using behavioral 
corporate finance.  
The issue with the mainstream behavioral literature is its use of the ‘rational man’ as a 
basis from which to judge ‘irrational’ behavior associated with the insights mentioned above. 
To integrate behavioral insights on a structural level, free from the mainstream 
rational/irrational distinction, ‘emotional finance’ is introduced. Emotional finance is a 
bourgeoning offshoot of contemporary behavior theory, first introduced by Taffler & Tuckett 
(2005). These authors apply Freudian psychoanalytic to the unconscious decisions made by 
investors in an uncertain environment. Among the vital contributions of emotional finance are 
the development of investment narratives and the state of market confidence. Section 3 will 
examine emotional finance more rigorously, connect the insights to mainstream behavioral 
theory, and incorporate the merged theory into a Minskian understanding of economic 
dynamics. This integration is named the emotional-Minskian framework and represents a 
holistic understanding of macro dynamics.  
Minsky acknowledges that most models of instability (including his own early data 
analysis8) are insufficient for real-world application because they do not consider uncertainty. 
Fragility builds most rapidly when uncertainty is overlooked or inaccurately accounted for by 
mathematical calculation in financing decisions during economic expansion. Minsky explains 
this phenomenon as the 'economics of euphoria' (Minsky, 1972; See Shiller (2000) for a more 
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contemporary example of the concept). For Minsky, the Credit Crunch of 1966 is a prime 
example of the consequences of an economy in a euphoric state – defined by "a belief that the 
future promise[s] perpetual expansion" (Minsky, 1972, p. 7). The belief of perpetual 
expansion, or at least prolonged expansion without severe contraction, can tempt financial 
officers and investors to become riskier in their financial decision-making. 
More generally, economic euphoria creates an environment for financial innovation to 
take place. The confluence of euphoria and innovation creates a particularly unstable 
environment. As the market becomes more comfortable with the idea of perpetual expansion, 
investors will take the opportunity to acquire assets with increased profit potential "by 
engaging in liquidity-decreasing portfolio transformation" (Minsky, 1972, p. 10). With 
enlarged risk appetites, investors may also be drawn to innovations in the market that tend to 
"induce capital gains, increase investment, and increase profits" (Minsky, 1986, p. 199). 
Innovation makes rational sense, as it is traditionally defined, when investors assume that 
markets will function efficiently, but ultimately creates a new market where both asset holders 
and potential borrowers depend on the "continued normal functioning" of the market (Minsky, 
1986, p. 243). Emotional finance helps to explain the processes by which investment narratives 
are formed and reaffirmed in a market environment with ubiquitous uncertainty.  
Minsky returns to uncertainty in the marketplace as a main driver that moves the 
economy from fragile to unstable to crisis. One of the attributes of financial vulnerability, as 
he defines it, is "the building into the financial structure of asset prices that reflect boom or 
euphoric expectations," which crumble in a state of crisis (Minsky, 1972, p. 60).9 Uncertainty 
                                                          
9 The other two phenomena that contribute to financial vulnerability are 1) the growth of financial – balance 
sheet and portfolio – payments relative to income payments; and 2) the decrease in the relative weight of 





clearly plays a crucial role in the eventual demise of assets priced in euphoric conditions 
because the realization of an uncertain future is flattening for investors who, for a prolonged 
period of time, were nearly certain of future economic outcomes.   
In the Minskian perspective, the contemporary economic paradigm – money-manager 
capitalism - "has led to a heightening of uncertainty at the firm and plant level" (Minsky, 1996, 
p. 363). In this current economic system, highly leveraged funds seek maximum return in an 
environment that systematically underprices risk, which eventually hurts those firms with 
relatively conservative investment strategies (Wray, 2011). To compete, firms with more 
conservative financing structures must become more aggressive to increase profitability. As 
risk becomes increasingly overlooked and the opportunity for market share narrows, firms 
must adapt. Minsky fused market psychology and competitive tendencies to develop an 
"economic theory which explains why our economy is sometimes stable and sometimes 
unstable" (Minsky, 1980, p. 210).  
The psychological element of fragility cycles is important in both understanding the 
tendencies of the modern financial sector and justifying regulation. In applying emotional 
psychology to financial institutions, we will remain consistent with Minsky's structural 
approach. For example, heuristics like anchoring, availability, and over-confidence affect 
markets at the macro-level through asset valuation and risk assessment (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). These heuristics and biases can be useful in explaining market dynamics, 
but only if they are applied within an emotional finance framework. Emotional finance frees 
the mainstream behavioral literature from assuming an identifiable point of equilibrium. 
There is some existing integration of behavioral economics and the FIH to explain how 





market psychology because "for Minsky, as for Keynes," it "is not an objective process, since 
it is conducted under uncertainty" (Dow, 2008:253). This idea will be explored more 
thoroughly when we explain how the indicator can be utilized to understand market 
psychology. The specific elements of behavioral economics will be discussed at length in the 
later section.  
Behavioral theory also uses the FIH to justify macroprudential policy reform (Dow, 
2011). The financial market is vulnerable to psychological shifts that come with innovation 
and increased uncertainty in expected profits, which leads to an environment where a debt-
deflation process is possible. While some argue for the introduction of systemic risk into 
existing financial models, Minsky argues that, while predictable, structural cycles do not have 
a determinant timeline because of the erratic nature of market psychology (Dow, 2011). Ponzi 
finance is so dangerous because it is impossible to forecast the moment when a given firm will 
need to be liquid, especially after a sustained period where increased profitability comes at the 
expense of dangerously narrow margins of safety. Minsky did not portend a model that 
indicated macro psychology. 
The indicator will look to identify narrow safety margins which can helped be 
explained by the prevailing market sentiment at a given point in time. Regulators can use the 
indicator in conjunction with market-focused psychological analysis to better understand 
where the financial sector. If, for example, firms have decreasing safety margins, but regulators 
and market commentators maintain a generally positive outlook, there will be greater urgency 
for firms to give more liquidity cushion. We will now discuss the ways that institutions charged 






2.4.3 Incorporating Human Rights 
Incorporating human rights in the framework is important because it provides a 
valuable analytical lens for regulators. Rights considerations imbue the cost of fragility on both 
the societal and individual levels. Assume, for example, that each individual has a 'right to life.' 
The complexities of a right like this are debated endlessly, but for simplicity a right to life has 
both a negative and positive rights element. The negative element is the right to against murder 
and the positive element is access to the resources that are necessary for life – namely food, 
water, clothing, healthcare, and shelter.  
In the current capitalist structure of developed economies, a person must purchase most 
the elements that help ensure an appropriate livelihood. By extension, the capitalist structure 
necessitates either an income or safety net that allows for the continued purchase of these 
elements of livelihood. In many cases, individuals and families must finance rights that are too 
expensive for present incomes like housing, healthcare, and education. Understanding that 
human rights language can be applied in a broad sense is crucial for our framework.  
‘Human rights’ is a general term with theoretical foundations that are continually 
debated (Nussbaum, 1997; Sen, 2005). As such, the term is often associated with a doctrinal 
abstractness that limits the applicability of the language. This is evident in the term's near-
complete absence from the finance literature. It may seem initially that the analysis of financial 
fragility is not conducive to the inclusion of human rights theory and language. Scholars who 
discuss fragility miss a crucial opportunity to integrate specific human rights language into the 
literature. Similarly, human rights thinkers, especially those focused on social and economic 
rights, should be willing to consider the relationships that people and communities have with 
the financial system. Dowell-Jones & Kinley (2011) share this view and establish areas of 





There does exist a growing literature that considers rights in relation to finance. The 
theoretical underpinnings of the literature have critical shortcomings that must be 
acknowledged and rebuked. Currently, corporate based rights theory and individual-
relationship theory limit the applicability of human rights within the macro financial market 
place. Integrating a macro approach with Minskian inspiration provides human rights scholars 
with a vital foundation for understanding the implications of the rights-finance relationship.  
As alluded to above, there are many possible definitions of 'human rights,' which is 
another deterrent to rights-finance integration.  Rights, in this specific framework, are protected 
by an institutional apparatus meant to serve the well-being of a given polity. Any individual 
who is a member of said polity should have his or her well-being protected. For the purposes 
of establishing rights in a financial fragility context, 'well-being' can be measured by the extent 
to which the financial system affects the people connected to it. People are worse off as the 
financial sector becomes increasingly fragile and are the worst off during times of instability.  
Nearly every person in a modern economy is tied to the financial system, whether it be 
through a direct loan, a job at a firm that depends on stable financial conditions, among myriad 
different arrangements. Incorporating this definition of rights into the financial literature may 
seem unnecessarily complex considering the interconnectedness of the financial system. In the 
context of financial fragility, however, the well-being of one country's population is very 
similar to that of another.   
          The role of political institutions in regulating institutions and monitoring fragility 
provides some common ground for rights and finance scholars. The current impetus on 
political institutions to regulate the financial sector with rights-motivations is muted, however. 





a mischaracterization of the historical relationship between the US and economic rights 
(Whelan & Donnelly, 2007). It is important to understand the progressive historical stances 
that US government bodies have taken to protect citizens from adverse economic conditions. 
As the economy has transformed its financial networks, the justification for rights-based policy 
has been forgotten. If change is to come, rights scholars must alter their views of the US 
relationship with economic rights. Once an accurate history is comprehended, rights scholars 
will be able to adapt frameworks as the economy evolves. 
          In the current macroeconomic environment, it is the duty of Big Government10 to 
recognize the increasing financial fragility. With the Great Recession as an example, the 
regulatory bodies of the United States had the responsibility to detect fragility to protect the 
US population from the consequences of crippling recession. The fragility was not anticipated 
and the reverberations of collapse continue to be painful. Foreclosures and sustained credit 
damage followed the 2007 crash. Not only was the right to shelter compromised, but the ability 
to finance and enjoy rights was compromised in the wake of financial turmoil. If the fragility 
had been detected and quelled, US citizens would have been better protected from financial 
turmoil. 
 The theoretical connections presented between rights and finance will be significantly 
expanded on in Section 4. The main goals of the human rights section are to utilize the financial 
fragility theory to justify Big Government’s role in financial markets with rights-based policies 
and to progress the rights-finance relationship. 
 
                                                          
10 We use the term “Big Government” as Minsky (1986) does. Our usage, however, will always include 






 This chapter presents the theoretical underpinnings that will be applied throughout. 
Minsky’s FIH will be expanded upon in later chapters in very different contexts. Minsky’s 
organic open-system methodology is not bounded by unwieldy mathematical models 
developed using ineffectual assumptions. The next two chapters will demonstrate the potential 
of the FIH to transform conventional thinking across multiple academic fields. The extension 
of Minsky’s theory is not to diminish its validity, but to expand the reach of the macro frame. 
























Psychology has had a long and, at times, strenuous, relationship with economics and finance. 
This section will briefly trace the development of behavioral psychology, specifically, and its 
integration into both economics and finance. As mentioned in the Introduction, the 
contemporary literature focuses too narrowly on micro-level analysis. Once the literature is 
surveyed, the most compelling arguments from the literature will be integrated into a macro-
level Minskian framework. Behavioral economics does not seem to have a natural connection 
to Minsky on first consideration. Much of the behavioral debate focuses on repeated individual 
action, while Minsky develops an extension of Keynesian macroeconomics. The integration of 
mainstream behavioral economics may appear Hicksian11 in nature. Instead of relying on 
micro-foundations, however, this paper will use the behavioral insights help explain the 
endogeneity of fragility at a structural level. An emphasis is placed on narrative building and 
the ways in which structural dynamics reinforce narratives.  
It is important to understand the processes by which financing decisions are made 
because these financing decisions manifest in either hedge, speculative, or Ponzi regimes. 
Kregel (2008) argues that the endogenous evolutionary process of fragility must be based on 
something more than euphoria alone because bankers are “neither gullible nor irrational” (p. 
4). This paper agrees with Kregel and provides a more rigorous understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms of euphoria and its role in perpetuating fragility.  
                                                          
11 John Hicks developed the IS/LM curve after Keynes’ seminal General Theory, which gave Keynes’ 
macroeconomic approach ‘micro-foundations.’ The synthesis of classical and Keynesian economics is a 





Managerial decisions to take certain financing positions, for example, are based on 
narratives that are emotionally motivated conceptions of future financial conditions. In times 
of economic growth and stability, the market develops a confidence based on prevailing 
narratives that financial innovations will continue to increase profit margins. Margins of safety 
weaken as riskier investment narratives are reaffirmed by success in the recent past. 
Understanding the persistence of riskier narratives despite increasingly illiquid balance sheets 
offers important insight to the drivers of Minskian fragility. In formulating this explanation of 
Minskian theory, we will utilize some of the more prominent findings in contemporary 
behavioral research, including aspects of cognition like heuristics and biases. Instead of 
applying them to the consumer, however, this paper will apply theories like these to the 
aggregate financial sector.  
This chapter introduces ‘emotional finance,’ a growing subfield of behavioral 
economics and finance. Emotional finance builds on Freudian principles and lends itself more 
directly to explain capitalist dynamics in Minskian terms. The psychoanalytical approach to 
emotional finance diverges from more popular behavioral economics because it demonstrates 
the endogenous nature of fragility and does not assume rationality, in the traditional sense, at 
any stage. Aspects of heuristics and biases explained in micro-behavioral analysis will be 
extended to the emotional finance macro-analysis.  
The first section establishes a distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ behavioral 
economics. New behavioral economics is considered the mainstream literature. Its prominence 
necessitates additional sub-sections to examine its main insights, namely the development of 
heuristics and biases, and its treatment of rationality. Once the mainstream literature is situated, 





the findings of the mainstream behavioral literature with emotional finance theory. The 
concluding sub-section draws explicit connections from emotional finance theory to Minskian 
economic analysis.  
3.1 Brief Survey of Existing Literature  
3.1.1 ‘Old’ vs. ‘New’ Behavioral Economics 
Before the decision-making processes of financial managers are considered, the foundations 
of behavioral economics and finance must be established. The traditional integration of 
psychology and economics has centered on investor behavior to explain deviations from the 
‘rational’ models of expected utility theory and the rational expectations hypothesis. In framing 
the psychological approach in the terms of economic rationality, instability is treated as “an 
aberration, with respect to an equilibrium path” (Dow S. , Cognition, Market Sentiment and 
Financial Instability: Psychology in a Minsky, 2011, p. 6). While this treatment is problematic 
for appreciating Minskian dynamics, it must be understood.  
The most famous behavioral economic literature measures cognitive abnormalities as 
deviations from the rational choice model, a pillar of neoclassical theory. The baseline 
consideration of a purely rational actor acknowledges the possibility for rational man. While 
the pioneers of contemporary behavioral economics research (Kahneman, Tversky, Shiller, 
etc.) tend reject the reality of purely rational thinking, there are those who contend that certain 
actors have the resources and abilities to act ‘rationally’ (Arrow, 1986). The work of most 
behavioral economics, however, has served to augment the neoclassical view of a rational 
agent. This brand of behavioral economics comprises the newest aspect of a broader 
incorporation of psychology into economics. An in-depth understanding of the historical roots 





There are myriad examples in the literature of authors who survey the shifting 
paradigms in behavioral theory. From a taxonomy of behavioral thought (Barberis & Thaler, 
2003) to the development of behavioral corporate finance (Baker, Ruback, & Wurgler, 2007; 
Baker & Wurgler, 2011) to defining emotional finance’s role (Fairchild, 2012). These surveys 
are all useful in contextualizing the motivations behind the current behavioral literature. The 
most interesting survey in this immediate context, however, elucidates the broader shifts in 
behavioral theory that have, in recent decades, led to a more complete integration into 
economic literature.  
Sent (2004) presents a comprehensive survey of 'Old' and 'New' behavioral economics 
that gives the reader insights into the historical development of the field. The pioneers of old 
behavioral economics like George Katona, P.W.S. Andrews, Neil Kay, and Herbert Simon 
introduce behavioral studies into economics as early as the 1950s and are mostly unfamiliar or 
unpersuasive to neoclassical economists. Sent divides this early approach to behavioral studies 
into four thought groups, each represented by one of the authors above.  
. Katona led a group that studied attitude and the influence of attitude on decision 
making. Andrews studied uncertainty and coordination with a group at Oxford; Kay led a 
Stirling University cohort focused on eclecticism and integration. Simon and his colleagues 
focus on bounded rationality, which maintains that one person never has all the information 
necessary to make a 'rational' decision. The theory of bounded rationality also argues that 
people have 'cognitive limits' (Simon, 1972). This means that even if an agent did have all of 
the information necessary to make a ‘rational’ decision, the agent would not be able to 





be expanded on later in the section. Each of these approaches, however, diverged from the 
prevailing focus on utility theory and maximization.  
Sent argues that these early attempts to incorporate behavioral studies into economics 
were rejected partly due to their explicit efforts to break from mainstream economic thought 
(Sent, 2004, p. 742). The four largest bands of initial behavioral researchers formulated 
arguments just as the neoclassical synthesis and rational expectations hypothesis were 
augmenting their positions as the economic norm. To understand the field as it most commonly 
exists today, we must explore the transition period between the older and more contemporary 
schools that Sent outlines. 
Sent identifies Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky as the pioneers of behavioral 
economics and finance as we understand it today. The work by these two psychologists acted 
as a catalyst for behavioral applications in economic theory and won Kahneman a Nobel Prize 
in economics.12 Their three most influential contributions are heuristics and biases, framing 
effects, and prospect theory (Sent 2004). These elements will be incorporated into emotional 
finance later, but are important to mention in the transition process. As acknowledged above, 
behavioral economists may reject the reality of a rational man, but the implicit assumption in 
much behavioral research holds that a person can actively fight against 'irrational' processes 
detract from a purely ‘rational’ decision-making process. Indeed, Kahneman reveals that "the 
rational-agent model was [his] starting point and the main source of [his] null hypothesis" 
(Kahneman, 2003). 
As the findings of behavioral studies became too convincing to ignore, neoclassical 
economists looked for ways to incorporate the theories into their existing models. The theories 
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surrounding the psychological aspect of economic decision-making have been studied 
extensively through finance and saving behavior (Sent, 2004, p. 749). These elements of 
finance have vast datasets that demonstrate the fallibility of human judgment when considering 
the economic man as a baseline. Sent argues that economists have embraced new behavioral 
economics and psychological insights because of mathematical difficulties in modelling 
attempts, among a few other reasons (Sent, 2004).  
One can argue that neoclassicals have adopted the behavioral insights of Kahneman, 
Tversky, in ways that have support, not diminish, their theoretical foundations. Behavioral 
theory, after all, can be framed as a path toward sustainable equilibrium. In this way, new 
behavioral economics is mostly incompatible with a Minsky framework that focused on 
structural dynamics. This paper will, however, use some of the insights of new behavioral 
economics in concert with older theories in a way that is consistent with a broader, Minskian 
approach. Before this integration is possible, however, the underpinnings of mainstream 
behavioral theory must be appreciated. The next sub-section will briefly discuss the 
development of heuristics and biases. This will be followed by the mainstream’s treatment of 
rationality in decision-making.  
3.1.2 Heuristics and biases 
The concept of heuristics and biases are the cornerstone of mainstream behavioral analysis. 
Cognitive psychologists consider heuristics and biases to be systemic outgrowths of the 
decision-making process. They are paramount in capturing the ‘irrationality’ that appear in 
behavioral models.  
  The behavioral finance literature grows directly from the work in behavioral 





breaking paper has been cited over 41,000 times13 and has set the groundwork for modern 
integration of psychological theory into economics. Heuristics “reduce the complex tasks of 
assessing likelihoods and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations” and biases are 
interpretations of information that generate heuristic thought (Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment 
under uncertainty: heuristics and biases, 1974, p. 1124). The concept of heuristics is related to 
bounded rationality in that it recognizes that people must make accommodations for limited 
mental capacity. The initial heuristics that the authors present are representativeness, 
availability, anchoring and adjustment.  
 The representative heuristic is typically used when probabilistic judgements are 
required. In developing representativeness, Tversky & Kahneman (1974) observe that 
extraneous details can influence assessments of probability in uncertainty. The availability 
heuristic demonstrates that people include information that is most easily accessible in their 
probabilistic assessments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring is the act of assigning 
importance to the first information that is given and influences probabilistic assessment as 
individuals adjust from the anchor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
 Biases feed into the processes of heuristic decision-making and have been developed 
extensively in the behavioral literature. Included in this literature is the field of behavioral 
finance, which applies heuristics to financial markets. Barberis & Thaler (2003) present a 
comprehensive summary of the biases most applicable to financial markets including 
overconfidence, wishful-thinking, and belief perseverance. These all demonstrate the 
deviations from the expected utility framework that financial economists have long relied on 
to understand investors’ decisions-making process. 
                                                          





 Research has demonstrated that individuals are typically overconfident in their 
judgements (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). This means that people are less likely to revisit initial 
assessments even as information changes. Related to overconfidence is optimism and wishful-
thinking, which positively skew peoples’ perceptions of their own abilities (Barberis & Thaler, 
2003). Indeed, wishful-thinking can compound overconfidence, which can make change ever 
more difficult. Belief perseverance is the diplomatic way of describing stubbornness. Research 
finds that once ideas are developed, they are clung to despite changing environments (Barberis 
& Thaler, 2003). These biases will be important when integrating mainstream behavioral 
finance and emotional finance. 
 It is important to acknowledge here that ‘rational’ economic agents are assumed to 
make probabilistic assessments based on Bayesian probabilities (Albert, 2003). Behavioral 
economics and finance demonstrate that people have a difficult time assessing these 
probabilities, but imply that improvement is possible. The treatment of rationality in the 
mainstream literature is vital to understand to develop an alternative case.  
3.1.3 Rationality 
The question of rationality in the behavioral literature is a crucial one. Mainstream literature 
assumes that deviations from ‘rational’ models are explained by ‘irrational’ behavior. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974, 1986) do expose decision-making processes as 
characteristically ‘irrational’ in the economic sense of the word. The heuristics and bias 
discussed in the preceding section imply limitations to rational thought.  
 Barberis & Thaler (2003) define rationality as in two ways: “First, when [agents] 
receive new information, [they] update their beliefs correctly…” and “Second, given their 
beliefs, agents make choices that are normatively acceptable” according to expected utility 





they allow for models which are believed to predict economic market conditions. Rationality 
is crucial for establishing a point of equilibrium in markets, which is the guiding pillar of 
neoclassical theory.  
 While behavioral scholars recognize that rationality, as it is traditionally conceived, is 
limited, there is a necessary belief that agents can improve their decision-making. The belief 
is necessary for the integration into an economic theory that is fundamentally flawed. One of 
the central issues with behavioral economics and finance as they presently exist is the 
assumption that irrationality can be consciously corrected.  
 The next section introduces emotional finance, which disposes of the rational/irrational 
distinction and focuses on the influence of the unconscious. This treatment of investor behavior 
provides for a more realistic understanding of market behavior and develops a groundwork for 
macro integration.  
3.2 Emotional Finance  
3.2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings 
As discussed above, the assumption in mainstream behavioral literature is that individuals can 
minimize or eliminate heuristics and biases to become a truly rational agent (DellaVega, 2009; 
Dow S. , Cognition, Market Sentiment and Financial Instability: Psychology in a Minsky, 
2011). It is difficult to apply the mainstream behavioral theory to financial decision makers on 
a macro level. Extrapolating the biases described in new behavioral economics is an 
irresponsible reduction of general market forces. For this reason, the new behavioral approach 
to decision making is unsuited to explain Minskian dynamics on its own. This section will 
build instead on Herbert Simon’s theory of ‘bounded rationality’ and explore the growing field 





decision makers develop convictions which augment capitalist dynamics driven by innovation 
and complacency in times of stability.  
 Emotional finance connects to Simon’s bounded rationality because it emphasizes the 
connections between conviction building and group behavior. A ‘rational’ actor will choose 
the optimal financing decision based on every piece of necessary information. Bounded 
rationality suggests, however, that even if a person did have access to all of the relevant 
information, there are cognitive limits that would restrict its processing (Simon, 1972). This 
implies that financial decision makers, on the aggregate, develop convictions not from their 
perfectly objective independent analysis, but from peer activities. 
 Emotional finance provides a psychoanalytic framework to financial markets in that it 
attempts to explain how market participants formulate investment ideas unconsciously. The 
authors’ psychoanlaytic framework offer a very different explanation of market moves than do 
financial economists. Their focus is on aspects of the unconcious mind such as ‘psychic reality’ 
and ‘phantastic objects.’ Psychic reality14 can reinforce decisions to hold risky or overvalued 
financial products because market confidence makes them  “highly desirable in a compelling 
or hard to resist way” (Taffler & Tuckett, 2005, p. 6).  
A phantastic object “is a mental representation of something…which in an imagined 
scene fulfils the protagonist’s deepest desires to have exactly what she wants exactly when she 
wants it” (Tuckett & Taffler, Phantastic Objects and the financial market's sense of reality: A 
psychoanalytic contribution to the understanding of stock market instability, 2008, p. 395). 
Phantasy in financial markets drives investors and managers to seek financial products that 
                                                          
14 “Psychic or psychical reality is ‘a term often used by Freud to designate whatever in the subject’s psyche 
presents a consistency and resistance comparable to those displayed by material reality; fundamentally, what is 
involved here is unconscious desire and its associated phantasies’ [Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973, p.363]” 





will provide the highest returns. Phantasy plays a crucial role in the construction of narratives 
which embolden market confidence. This theory explains the desire in the financial sector to 
innovate and distribute financial products as often as possible to enhance market influence. In 
an era of consolidation, the psychic realities and phantasies of the top few firms can push an 
entire sector into increasing fragility.  
 Phantastic objects excite investors and financial decision makers, whether it be new 
asset classes, new financial instuments, or new ways of doing business. Tuckett & Taffler 
(2008) argue that when phantastic objects embedd themselves in the thinking of financial 
decision makers, they alter perceptions of reality and possibilities. This is a historic 
phenomenon that led to outlandish predictions of the Dow Jones hitting 40,000 in 1999 
(Shiller, 2000) and the real estate market expanding in perpetuity in 2007.  
 When the financial markets succomb to phatastic objects, it necessitates action by those 
in the markets who might not accept the phantasy. As the phantasy is validated by increasingly 
impressive returns, actors who have remained prudent may alter their perceptions and adopt 
the phantasy. Neglecting to adopt the phantasy can be detrimental in the short run and, thus, 
inspires changes in asset allocation (Tuckett & Taffler, 2008). Changing asset allocations can 
leads to changes in balance sheet composition, which eventually narrow safety margins. 
Phantasy also manifests in risk management, a process that has become accepted by the 
financial community despite the fact that it projects past performance into an uncertain future. 
This is another structural element of unconscious thought manifested at the macro level that 
magnifies capitalist dynamics (Tuckett & Taffler, 2008).  
 Tuckett (2009) argues that the cyclical market behavior driven by the belief in 





system. He argues that “involvement in financial markets necessarily lets loose thoughts, 
feelings and behaviors that cannot be successfully contained and mitigated,” despite current 
belief in risk management and analytical ability (Tuckett, 2009, p. 1). Most important for 
Tuckett is that the implications of emotional finance are interpreted correctly. He argues that 
it is not useful to categorize behavior as irrational or rational because it implies that emotions 
and rationality are “intrinsically  opposed” (Tuckett, 2009, p. 9). It also necessitates that 
observers assess decisions “not from the viewpoint of the actor in the situation he found himself 
when making the decision but from the viewpoint at its outcome” (Tuckett, 2009, p. 19). 
Tuckett promotes emotional finance as a way for commentators and, more importantly, 
regulators to understand the psyche of financial markets to inspire proactive measures to 
combat highly charged emotions.  
 Taffler & Tuckett (2005) use their theory of emotional finance to explain the rampant 
over-valuations that preceded the Dot com crash of 2001. In their psychoanalytic perspective, 
they argue that “investors became caught up emotionally” in their market activity, making 
‘rational’ analysis impossible (Taffler & Tuckett, 2005, p. 2, original emphasis). Financial 
decisions are driven by emotions that are amplified by group dynamics. It is important to 
remember that the original application of the theory is focused on retail and institutional 
investors who actively buy and sell stocks. When applied more generally, the theory helps to 
explain the gradual shifts in financing stages that increase fragility in the financial markets. 
 Tuckett & Taffler (2012) substantiate their theory in a survey to fund managers. They 
interviewed fifty-two managers, most of whom managed at least $1 billion to better understand 
the role of emotions in the day-to-day operations of a finance professional. The respondents 





experience as a portfolio manager (Tuckett & Taffler, 2012, p. 12). This approach was 
extremely unique as surveys are not a common technique used to examine the financial 
markets. The findings of their survey substantiated the emotional finance theory in impressive 
ways.  
 The most momentous finding through the survey analysis was the manager reliance on 
story-telling. The authors found that managers develop stories to generate the confidence and 
assurance needed to make decisions in a highly uncertain environment. They also use stories 
to attract investors and to give the impression that there exists an information gap which they 
are privy to (Tuckett & Taffler, 2012, p. 44). In some ways, the managers are susceptible to 
the availability and confirmation biases. Tuckett & Taffler (2012) mention that managers are 
reaffirmed in their financing decisions when they hear new information that aligns with their 
story, which is a classic example of confirmation bias. Once the story is given time to percolate, 
it typically takes a drastic market move to sway the manager that the story might be misguided.  
 Tuckett and Taffler also attempt to change the popular narrative when it comes to the 
specific emotions that drive market participants. Instead of the conventional ‘greed, fear, hope’ 
drivers, the psychoanalysts prefer “excitement (at the prospect of gain), …anxiety (at the 
prospect of loss) …and denial (of ambivalence)” (Tuckett & Taffler, 2012, p. 95, emphasis 
added). In each case, the preferred emotions of the emotional finance scholars develop 
unconsciously. These new emotional drivers also allow observers and regulators to understand 
more holistically the ways that investment decisions are made.  
Chong & Tuckett (2015) build on the theoretical and applied work discussed so far. 
They adopt the term ‘ontological uncertainty,’ which problematizes economic action itself, 





312). Their analysis incorporates the emotions that Tuckett & Taffler (2012) introduce in 
exploring emotional conflict and the ability of narratives to resolve these conflicts. 
Understanding the drivers of emotional decision making in the face of uncertainty is a vital 
component of emotional finance. 
To operate in an environment of ontological uncertainty and to combat emotional 
conflict financial actors rely on ‘conviction,’ the belief state of individuals, and ‘confidence’, 
the belief state of the collective (Chong & Tuckett, 2015, p. 310). The culmination of emotional 
finance theory, with its emphasis on emotions and investment narratives, is a heterodox theory 
of financial markets that bolsters Minskian analysis. Managers constantly look for indications 
that reaffirm their convictions by observing the prevailing confidence that the market has. The 
foundations of narratives, convictions, and confidence are dynamic in nature and magnify the 
fragility inherent to capitalist systems as narratives persist.  
Emotional finance reframes the role of emotion in decision-making to accommodate 
the unconscious formation of beliefs in certain financing positions. Instead of assuming that 
economic actors periodically stray from the ‘rational’ course of action, emotional finance 
provides an understanding of decision making at a systemic level. That is not to argue, 
however, that the insights of new behavioral economics are fruitless. Contrarily, some of the 
mainstream insights are crucial in understanding market psychology once unconscious 
motivations become conscious justifications for narratives. The next sub-section will utilize 
new behavioral economic insights to bolster the emotional finance literature. 
3.3 Connecting Mainstream Behavioral Insights to Emotional Finance  
While behavioral finance and emotional finance are substantively different in theoretical 





conviction and confidence, agents must consciously rationalize decisions. This rationalization 
process includes the utilization of biases like wishful-thinking and belief perseverance. Since 
the emphasis here is on the importance of emotional finance, the definition of biases is 
different. 
 Wishful-thinking and optimism have a different context in emotional finance. Instead 
of distorting heuristic processes, these ‘biases’ serve to reaffirm narratives and support 
convictions. The relationship is not limited to these two examples. Any number of traditionally 
conceived biases can influence the perception of economic action. This relationship is not 
explicit in the emotional finance theory, but it exists.  
The focus on narrative-bolstering cognitive processes is important and should be 
considered in the emotional finance literature. If emotional finance scholars reframe biases in 
the context of conviction and the relationship of market confidence, their theory may be more 
compelling to scholars aligned with mainstream behavioral finance. Once of the most exciting 
aspects of emotional finance is that it has not yet been adopted by any particular economic 
theory. This gives it the latitude to further develop in an economic context. 
The rest of this section will briefly establish the integration of behavioral and emotional 
finance to lay the foundations for an emotional-Minskian framwork. Fairchild (2012) develops 
a theory of emotional corporate finance, which builds on the existing literature in behavioral 
corporate finance. Behavioral corporate finance applies the findings of behavioral finance to 
the institutional study of corporate finance (Baker & Wurgler, 2011). This is important for 
studying behavior in a Minskian context because it focuses on the processes by which 





emotional finance in understanding managerial decisions that contribute to Minskian 
dynamics. Fairchild formalizes this line of thinking with emotional corporate finance.  
3.3.1 Emotional Corporate Finance: Setting the Stage for Minsky  
The most useful application of the emotional finance theory in this context is understanding 
the ways in which financial decision makers develop convictions for investment decisions. 
Their investment decisions shape balance sheets and alter safety margins. Steps toward 
understanding managerial decisions have been taken in behavioral corporate finance. 
Behavioral corporate finance asserts that managers are typically overly optimistic and loss-
averse in ways that distort financial decision making (Heaton, 2002; Tekin, 2016).  
Fairchild (2012) delineates the evolution the development of behavioral corporate 
finance. BCF focuses heavily on the biases of overconfidence and optimism/wishful-thinking 
when analyzing managerial financial decisions at the institutional level. The prevailing wisdom 
is that overconfidence at the managerial level has a weighty impact on investment appraisals 
(Fairchild, 2012). Fairchild argues that the emotional finance phantasy concept can be used to 
understand the source of overconfidence and other biases on a structural level. He develops 
this argument into a theory of emotional corporate finance that lends itself to Minskian theory. 
 In his model of emotional corporate finance, Fairchild maintains that a manager’s 
phantasy is reinforced for as long as the financing decision is successful. Due to the constraints 
of bounded rationality, the manager must construct a narrative drive by phantasy that enables 
a financial decision in an uncertain environment. Managerial phantasy is crucial in 
understanding the subconscious decision making that supports decisions for financial projects 
(Fairchild, 2012). 
 The relationship between subconscious and conscious biases is important to consider. 





their investment decisions. In this way, they fall victim to the confirmation bias or belief 
perseverance.15 This is not to argue that there exists a ‘rational’ alternative, but to recognize 
that managers will be more inclined to reaffirm their decision based on evidence that is 
inconclusive. For example, most market agents believed that the chances of widespread default 
in the mortgage market were infinitesimal, thus reassuring managers that the accumulation of 
mortgage backed securities were the right investment decision. In this case, a narrative was 
formed around a subconscious phantasy that managers could not divorce themselves from 
because of market confidence.  
Fairchild’s emotional corpoate finance provides theortical underpinngins for this 
endeavor. His theory provides an explicit link between the role that phantasy plays at the 
institutional level. Pixley’s work demonstrates the applicability of emotional corporate finance. 
She wrote before both Tuckket, Taffler, and Fairchild, but her work is important in 
corroborating the theories developed by these authors. 
Pixley (2004) takes a similar approach to Tuckett & Taffler (2009) in examining the 
role of emotion in financial decision-making. She too conducts survey research on market 
particpants and theorizes that on the role of trust and distrust at the institutional level. Pixley’s 
work makes sense in a Minskian framework because it focuses on institutions that are 
characteristic of any capitalist system. Emotional finance deals directly with aspects of investor 
mentatlity and market structure that do not have the same potential to be eradicated as 
individual heuristics and biases.  
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3.3 Minsky and Emotional Finance 
3.3.1 Animal Spirits 
It is important to reiterate at this point that an underlying theme of this paper is to reexamine 
Minskian dynamics in an era of consolidation. The psychological factors in financial markets 
are amplified when larger firms have the ability to develop convictions that drive market 
confidence. Fewer firms wielding more influence on the broader financial sector has important 
economic implications that we will discuss when we introduce the indicator. Here, we will 
weave together emotional finance, emotional corporate finance and Minskian theory.  
 Sheila Dow has written extensively on the integration of psychology into a 
Minskian/Keynesian macro framework. She appears to be one of the only authors writing on 
the explicit connections between emotional finance and Minsky. Dow has also written on 
macroeconomic methodology (1998) and the philosophical foundations of economics (1990, 
2009). It is important to acknowledge her other work because its influences are clear in her 
analysis of psychology. This is particularly helpful when examining her analysis of ‘animal 
spirits.’ 
 Keynesian ‘animal spirits’ have been revistied in the economic literature in recent 
decades, prompted by the proliferation of behavioral economics. Keynes developed the 
concept of animal spirits to explain economic functioning in an environment of future 
uncertainty (Keynes, 1936). The concept has been revived by prominent behavioral scholar 
like Akerlof & Shiller (2009) who argue that understanding animal spirits are crucial to 
macroeconomic theory. In the mainstream behavioral tradition, however, Akerlof & Shiller 
use animal spirits to explain deviations from equilibrium. The authors imply that these 





of a Keynesian concept is welcomed, the effectiveness of the contributiton is muted by 
neoclassical assumptions.  
 This view is shared by Dow (2013) who argues that the original defintion of animal 
spirits differs from the way the term is commonly understood. An accurate definition of animal 
spirits includes the acknowledgement that the role of optimistic expectations play in 
investment decisions and includes “a willingness to ignore the uncertainty surrounding these 
expectations” (Dow, 2013, p. 116). This original conception of animal spirits has applications 
in both emotional finance and Minsky. Indeed, for Keynes and Dow, animal spirits play an 
important role in an open and organic economic system where reason and evidence are not 
sufficient to justify decision making (Dow, 2013). This speaks directly to the formation of 
narratives and the persistence of conviction.  
 The comprehension of Keynesian animal spirits also plays an important role in 
structural development.  Dow & Dow (2011) apply animal spirits to innovation in the banking 
sector. They identify a shift in the financial sector beginning in 1960 where banks proactively 
compete for market share, which drives innovation within the sector (Dow & Dow, 2011). This 
is consistent with a Minskian framework and speaks directly to the relationship between 
fragility and emotional finance. As Dow & Dow point out, “market sentiment as conventional 
wisdom may be said to draw on animal spirits,” which can quickly solidify in a structural 
environment marked by intense consolidation (Dow & Dow, 2011, p. 15). The inclusion of the 
finacnial sector in the discussion of animal spirits is thus justified and encouraged.  
3.3.2 Explicit Minsky Connections 
The logic theoretical foundation for animal spirits in the financial sector is Minskian. The 
discussion of animal spirits implies a connection to Minsky since his theory of fragility is an 





incorporate the original conception of animal spirits into a macro framework, emotional 
finance is needed.  
 As mentioned previously, instability is misunderstood in the conventional literature. 
Dow (2010) offers a compelling reason for analyzing behavior in a Minskian context, citing 
his “uncertainty-based epistemology” that can take full advantage psychological insights in 
formulating a more accurate theory of instability (p. 262). Minskian dynamics are crucial for 
explaining cyclical market moves and provide an ideal vehicle for behavioral insights. This is 
especially true of structural-level insights that remain burdened with neoclassical assumptions.  
In determining the optimal behavioral insights, Dow maintains that emotional finance 
is the best fit. She argues that it is possible to employ emotional finance theory in a mainstream 
cognitive framework, but makes the most sense within a “Keynesian/Minskyan environment 
where there [are]…only conventionally-established assessments based on reason and 
evidence…which are vulnerable to shifts” (Dow, 2011, p. 241). Dow’s delination of Minskian 
cycles explained by psychology is so effective that we include it in its entirety: 
“First, sentiment underpins both cognition and action and cannot easily be separated 
from them, so that no theory is complete without it. This is inevitable given the 
understanding of the open-system nature of the subject matter, which precludes ‘true’ 
risk assessment. Reason and evidence (understood in a way conditioned by social 
convention) can only go so far, and market participants must rely also on (socially-
conventional) heuristics and ‘market sentiment’. Euphoric market sentiment is applied 
to the pursuit of financial gain builds on the dominance of phantasy on the part of some 
market leaders. As asset prices rise, confidence in (over-optimistic) expectations 
grows, reducing uncertainty and the anxious emotional state which that produces. But 
that anxiety increases after the bursting of the bubble: conventional expectations are 
confounded, increasing uncertainty and distrust increases. The turnaround requires 
enough of a willingness to act in spite of that uncertainty – an expression of animal 
spirits” (Dow S. , Cognition, Market Sentiment and Financial Instability: Psychology 





An emotional-Minskian framework provides a necessarily holistic understanding of the 
relationship between inevitable capitalist dynamics and the psychologial processes that guide 
them. 
This holistic approach is imperative in understanding the way that market sentiment 
drives capitalist dynamics when extensive consolidation is present in the financial sector. If 
the largest banks drive the trends for aggregate financing positions, then the psychology of 
their leaders must be understood. Dow (2011) outlines the way that financial leaders have 
overwhelming influence in the financing decisions of the broader financial markets. These 
frontrunners also rely on phantasy to dominate their actions in a rising market. Particularly 
intresting in her line of argumentation is contextualizing financial markets within social norms 
and reflexivity.  
Reflexivity is the a person’s understanding of his or her self in relation to a particular 
social norm framework (Soros, 2014). Financial leaders who understand their influence can 
perpetuate convictions about market directions, leading to justifications for riskier financing 
positions. Pixley’s (2004) work suggests that this phenomemon can happen on the firm level 
as well, with phantasies permeating an entire organization. This phantastic feedback loop helps 
explain why stability can be destabilizing as firms and market leaders become more 
comfortable taking risks in times of economic growth.  
  Incorporating the two theories provides a comprehensive understanding of market 
drivers. It is imperative, however, that the integration of psychology not be interpretated as a 
way to deterministically model economic cycles (Dow, 2010). The psychological insights of 





to time the ‘moment’ that confidence declines. It would be disingenuous to explain Minskian 
cycles with a theory that claimed an ability to time a debt-deflation spiral.   
3.4 Conclusion  
This section has demonstrated the key role that behavioral literature has in constructing a 
rounded macroeconomic theory. The shortcomings of mainstream scholars, compounded by 
inadequate neoclassical theory, require a sharp divergence from conventional wisdom. An 
emotional-Minsky framework provides the necessary foundation for a reformulation of 
orthodox thought.  
 The next section will demonstrate the ability of Minskian theory to accommodate 
human rights, another field with theoretical shortcomings. The human rights argument 
presented requires a reframing of rights solutions in a macro frame. The holistic 
macroeconomic theory presented in this section bolsters the opportunity to create an explicit 
rights-finance relationship.  




















4.1 Framing the Finance-Rights Relationship 
There exists a growing human rights literature that considers the rights implications of a 
complex financial sector. This integration is crucial for the development of comprehensive 
rights-based policy. Traditionally, scholars conflate financial markets with ‘real economy’ 
markets like manufacturing and labor.16 This approach may have been sufficient in the 
immediate post-war period, but as financial markets augment the most recent phase of 
capitalism – money-manager capitalism – academics must acknowledge the financial market 
and its growing complexities. Financial institutions no longer act solely as intermediaries and 
the repercussions of their transforming business models must be recognized. 
It is encouraging to see rights-scholars broaden their approach to account for the shift 
in capitalism. There is a vital focus, however, that is missing in the current methods. The 
research largely emphasizes micro-level solutions to human rights problems stemming from 
modern capitalism. Some prevailing literature, for example, outlines rights-conscious business 
models that multinational corporations should implement to combat rights violations like 
endemic poverty. As this literature extends into finance, it charges financiers to hold businesses 
to a higher rights-standard before investing.  
There are two fundamental issues with this approach. The first is the lack of a 
straightforward extension of the corporate-based approach for dealing with businesses in 
                                                          





developed countries with established political institutions. It is difficult to argue that 
corporations in developed nations should promote human rights ideals because that 
responsibility is typically bestowed unto their political institutions. Human rights, as they are 
generally conceived, operate on the international level, with little accommodation for country-
specific rights philosophies. While international pressure has the potential to cajole a domestic 
impetus to align with international standards, there are areas of recalcitrant conflict. This 
pervasive circumstance of human rights theory imposes a narrow financial focus on developing 
economies.  
The development focus misses the historical promotion of economic rights in 
developed countries. This history is relevant in places like the US, where ideological shifts in 
economic theory have facilitated rampant financial expansion in its economy. Financialization 
has changed the very essence of economic function and rights scholars, to this point, have not 
kept pace with the change. This is not to bequeath blame unto rights-scholars. Indeed, 
economists, regulators, and financial specialists have failed to understand the magnitude of 
change borne by recent economic developments (see: financial crisis of 2007-2009). Rights-
scholars and economists alike, however, must reframe their understanding of the modern 
capitalist system.  
This chapter outlines the lengths to which US political institutions have championed 
economic rights since the New Deal. Sovereign governing bodies have an inherent obligation 
to promote the well-being of its citizens. This obligation includes extending economic rights 
into the financial sector as the economy transforms. 
The second fundamental issue of the current literature is the focus on micro-level 





credit, wage levels, etc.) omit macro-frames. Analyzing the economy in a macro-frame 
provides insights into the systemic tendencies of the system. One should not discuss access to 
credit, for example, without understanding financial fragility. Financial inclusion is important, 
but with a system prone to collapse, inclusion can be counter-productive in the long run. Rights 
scholars must understand the language of economic theory and work to strengthen a system 
that is innately fragile.  
Advocacy work centered on business responsibility and inclusion is important to the 
livelihoods of people everywhere. Suitable employment and living wages are instrumental to 
rights theory. Even with living wages, however, there is research that shows people must take 
on debt to finance rights like healthcare, housing, and education. In an environment of complex 
and ubiquitous financial relationships, people are exposed to the negative repercussions that 
come with financial collapse. Minsky offers a structural economy theory that scholars can 
integrate into rights theory. Once capitalist dynamics are understood, micro-level solutions will 
be more effective and, most importantly, more sustainable. 
4.2 History of Rights-Driven Economic Policy in US 
4.2.1 Rights-based vs. Profits-based Frameworks 
As mentioned previously, US economic theory oscillates between rights- and profit-based 
frameworks. Hirsch & Morris (2010) present these historical changes in a law context, but the 
ideas apply directly to understanding the long-term US rights-finance relationship.17 They 
identify six stages where the framework changes. Between 1776-1820, the prevailing 
sentiment was that corporations existed by the “will of the government,” enabling stricter 
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government oversight18 (Hirsch & Morris, 2010, p. 71). This attitude changed between 1820-
1890 motivated by economic liberalism. The years between 1890-1920 developed a rights-
based framework, only to revert to profits-based between 1920-1932. A profits-based 
framework is characterized by laissez-faire policies where a rights-based framework makes a 
concerted effort to establish an apparatus resembling the modern social safety net (Hirsch & 
Morris, 2010). 
 The most relevant historical shift begins after the Great Depression with the advent of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal. The most recent era of a rights-based economic theory in the US takes 
place during 1932-1970. This era represents “a modest return of populist sympathies” and 
“increased inquiry into corporate social responsibility and the stakeholder primacy movement” 
(Hirsch & Morris, 2010, p. 71). The profits-based model manifests between the years 1970-
2009, with overwhelming belief in the ability of markets to provide optimal social outcomes. 
This most recent era is market by zealous deregulation and rapid financialization. One can 
argue that institutions such as the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) mark the 
beginning of a return of a rights-based framework. The indicator developed in this paper can 
help regulators bolster the rights-based framework by monitoring financial fragility to promote 
prolonged stability. Before that relationship is established, however, it is important to 
understand the historical influence that the US has wielded in promoting rights-based 
economic policy. 
4.2.2 The US as a Proponent of Economic Rights 
The overwhelming depiction of the West, and the United States in particular, in recent human 
rights literature is that political and civil rights have been historically prioritized above 
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economic and social rights. This narrative is shaped by the rhetoric of the Cold War and 
neglects the rights motivations of the New Deal. Indeed, there exists “widespread perception 
among human rights scholars and activists of Western hostility, or at best indifference, to 
economic and social rights,” which Whelan & Donnelly (2009) dub the “myth of Western 
opposition” (p. 909-910). The authors argue that the West promoted economic and social rights 
in the post-war development of an international human rights regime as domestic values shifted 
in the wake of the Great Depression. 
 Whelan & Donnelly’s (2009) focus on the West necessitates a survey of Europe, but 
we are most interested in their treatment of US policy. The most telling motivation of US 
support for economic rights is the formation of the ‘welfare state’ at the domestic level. FDR, 
as early as 1932, called for an economic declaration of rights and perpetuated that sentiment 
through 1944 when he “suggested that in addition to the rights and freedoms protected by the 
original bill of rights, the nation had already begun to accept a number of self-evident economic 
truths” (Whelan & Donnelly, 2007, p. 925). It is important to remember that this timeframe 
motivates a return to a rights-based economic framework and the acknowledgement that 
unregulated industry compromises the possibility of prolonged economic stability. This 
sentiment inspires the arguments presented in the present work. 
 Borgwardt (2005, 2008) and Katznelson (2013) also share the view that the economic-
rights-motivation for the New Deal is undeniable. Borgwardt argues that FDR’s ‘Four 
Freedoms’ speech “reflected an expanded notion of stability in early 1940s America, growing 
directly out of the devastating impact of the Great Depression,” (Borgwardt, 2008, p. 9). FDR’s 
inclusion of economic stability as a right, demonstrated a concerted effort by policymakers to 





government involvement to safeguard the rights of its citizens, including those rights 
associated with economics. Not only is this a trademark of a rights-based economic framework, 
it is applicable to a modern economy built on financial complexity.  
The Four Freedoms speech and the rhetoric it inspired also demonstrates how the 
consideration of economic rights amended the “traditional American conceptions of the 
national interest” which “resulted in an ideological transformation in mid-1940s America” 
(Borgwardt, 2008, p. 12). This is consistent with Whalen & Donnelly (2009) and the argument 
that FDR framed economic rights as a second Bill of Rights. Borgwardt also echoes the idea 
that the US played an integral role in promulgating economic rights on the international scale, 
a foundation upon which we will build (Borgwardt, 2005). FDR’s speech demonstrates the 
governmental intent to ensure the livelihood of every US citizen. There are many 
interpretations of the speech that extend to the international arena, but it will be analyzed in a 
domestic policy lens for our purposes. The New Deal was a policy intended to provide 
economic and political security. FDR’s policies ensured a safety-net for those who the market 
could not provide.  
 In Fear Itself, Katznelson (2013) recounts Schlesinger’s representation as a two part 
response to the crisis. The first, most relevant part of the policy, took measures to first “prevent 
starvation, ameliorate suffering, and jolt the capitalist economy from the Second New Deal’s 
long-term measures of economic regulation and social policy” (Katznelson, 2013, p. 35). FDR 
and Congress recognized the importance of taking steps to secure the well-being of the 
citizenry to match previously attained living standards. They focused first on the most basic 
aspects of well-being in the short-term with aspirations to prevent an economic and political 





structural reform is what makes the New Deal such a monumental piece of legislation. These 
aspects also demonstrate the deep roots of the responsibility that US government feels to 
protect its citizen’s well-being.  
 The myth of Western opposition is predicated on the Western reluctance to submit to 
quasi-judicial international monitoring, nineteenth century opposition, aggressive market 
advocacy in the Reagan-Thatcher era, and the attention paid to civil and political rights in the 
1970s (Whelan & Donnelly, 2007). Wehlan & Donelly maintain that human rights literature 
perpetuating the myth of Western opposition did not surface until the mid-late 1970s. This 
suggests that scholars analyzed more current debates in a Cold War West vs. East and North 
vs. South framework, projecting a Western aversion to economic rights backwards (Whelan & 
Donnelly, 2007). The overarching argument that the US has long been a proponent of 
economic rights is undeniable. There is, however, some validity to the argument that focuses 
on the short-comings of the welfare state through the profits-based shift in the 1970s.  
Most intriguing for this paper is Whelan & Donelly’s argument that the deregulation 
fervor of the Reagan era did not seriously threaten the broader welfare state. They cite 
increased government spending, social security transfers, and social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP between 1970 and 1995 as evidence that the historical tendencies of US 
domestic policy to accommodate economic rights remain in-tact (Whelan & Donnelly, 2007, 
p. 944, note 132). This argument represents a gap in considering the explicit finance-rights 
relationship. Implicit in the Whelan-Donnelly, Borgwardt, and Katznelson arguments is that 
the economies of the New Deal and Reagan eras are comparable. The proliferation and 
transformation of financial institutions and products that mark the Reagan era necessitate more 





The historical significance of increased social spending is important to Whelan & 
Donnelly’s broader argument, but they neglect the rapidly developing financial system that 
transformed business transactions and rights protection. The argument that “selective, largely 
incremental, retrenchments [of the welfare state] that have usually been undertaken only 
reluctantly and regrettably” has merit, but overlooks the growing weight of an increasingly 
complex financial sector (Whelan & Donnelly, 2007, p. 945).  
Financial complexity became increasingly problematic as ideological shifts gave way 
to the phenomenon of financialization. As financialization transformed the US and global 
economies, New Deal social policies gradually disintegrated. To understand the ramifications 
that social safety-net degradation had on rights, we will survey the change in the economic and 
financial landscape. As businesses offered fewer benefits and government spending became 
tighter, people had to rely on the credit markets to sustain their lifestyles. Lack of supervision 
and regulation put those whose credit reliance increased at a severe disadvantage, especially 
in times of growing fragility and instability. The next sub-section characterizes financialization 
as a departure from New Deal-era rights-motivated policy. 
4.2.3 Financialization’s Role in Compromising Rights  
Financialization, defined previously as the originate-and-distribute business model, is crucial 
for understanding the modern economy and its rights implications. There is intense debate 
focused on the effects of financialization on individual rights. This paper believes that the 
investigation into these rights outcomes are important, but in a different frame. We will briefly 
survey where the rights literature has incorporated financialization and interpret it on a macro 
scale. The integration of a macro-rights-finance framework into rights-based economic policy 





 Hacker (2004) develops the idea of ‘risk privatization,’ which maintains that social 
policies that mitigate salient risks faced by citizens have devolved overtime. This has 
manifested in a process by which “most potent threats to income are increasingly faced by 
individuals and families on their own, rather than by collective intermediaries” (Hacker, 2004, 
p. 244). Hacker’s line of argumentation is in the same vein as the bankruptcy literature that 
will be discussed later, but inspires contemplation of the mechanisms by which political 
structural change can negatively affect the rights of a population by increasing the vulnerability 
to financial fragility. The welfare state can be considered broadly as insurance against income 
loss. If, as Hacker argues, the structural reforms that started with a profits-based economic 
model in the 1970s gave the welfare state a more residual role, then there is an immediate need 
for monitoring fragility (Hacker, 2004). If fragility is not identified in the modern economy, 
the negative rights repercussions of financial collapse can be devasting to individuals, families, 
and communities. 
 Growth is prioritized over social protection in a profits-based economic framework. 
Mainstream economic theory postulates that market expansion will drive socially optimal 
scenarios. As alluded to above, the Reagan era ushered a simultaneous retrenchment of the 
traditional welfare state and a transformation of the financial system. As banks garner more 
autonomy, increasing amounts of loans are issued with the belief that growth is inevitable and 
unbounded. With a gradual decline in traditional welfare, people feel comfortable in their 
ability to take on debt to finance consumption, but also in financing rights such as housing. 
The attitudes of complacency and optimism turn quickly as banks recognize the issues with 
their balance sheets and demand loan repayment. The most recent crisis highlights the 





unemployment rises, incomes are lost on a macro-scale and, as a result of the residual nature 
of the welfare state, rights are compromised. The structural political changes that were inspired 
during the era of financialization fueled the most negative aspects of the structural tendencies 
of the economy.  
 To further substantiate the argument above, we examine the development of 
occupational welfare in the post-war era. Between 1950-1973, the period deemed ‘the long 
boom,’ the US unemployment rate sustained historic lows, fueled by robust economic growth 
(Cutler & Waine, 2001). During this time, corporations provided benefits for their employees, 
such as pension and healthcare benefits, known more broadly as occupational welfare. This 
type of welfare received criticism from liberal politicians as aj unsubstantial welfare substitute 
and from conservatives for being paternalistic (Cutler & Waine, 2001). Cutler & Waine argue 
that the financialization –or, prioritizing shareholder value guided by financial criteria – played 
a crucial role in the deterioration of occupational welfare and, thus, sizable portions of the US 
welfare apparatus. 
 Analyzed in a Minskian lens, the long boom was a time of general stability which 
gradually bred fragility. As growth rates and profits declined post-1973, the US adopted “neo-
liberal interventions designed to restore” the rates of profits observed in the post-war era 
(Cutler & Waine, 2001, p. 100). This dynamic represents the structural relationships between 
politics and the financial system. Occupational welfare, despite the debates surrounding it, 
served to bolster the welfare sentiment championed by FDR in the 1940s. The policies of the 
long-boom represented complacency on the part of policymakers who anticipated continued 
stability, which would preserve the grand-bargain made between the US government and 





alternative for those on the right who did not want increased government social spending 
(Cutler & Waine, 2001). 
As profits continued to decline, however, the government was ill-equipped to fill the 
welfare void as corporations rescinded benefits. There examples in the literature of the negative 
effects that financialization had on aspects of life such as retirement and housing. Lulled by 
complacency and optimism, regulators allowed for people to enter financial markets that were 
undergoing unprecedented change. The stinginess of corporations from 1973-on resulted in an 
ever-increasing number of Americans relying on the stock market to augment retirement 
savings (Soderberg, 2007). An increasing reliance on financial markets also manifested in 
housing markets with the dismantling of the housing welfare system (Rolnik, 2013). Exposure 
to the financial markets left many people vulnerable to the negative effects of fragility, 
culminating in the great financial crisis.  
The negative rights consequences of financialization and a profits-based framework are 
evident in recent decades. This development has inspired a large body of research which aims 
to combat compromising rights policies as they develop in the modern economy. Most of the 
solutions in the current literature, however, is inadequate because of the absence of a macro 
framework. Despite the recent developments, the literature would benefit from a historical 
view of the United States’ historical promotion of rights at the macro level.  
4.3 New Direction for Rights Literature 
4.3.1 Understanding the Existing Literature  
The modern capitalist system, with complex financial markets and consumer reliance on debt, 
can significantly compromise rights as fragility builds. There exists a growing understanding 





level. For example, there are authors who consider access to credit as a fundamental human 
right (Yunus, 2009). There are also authors who recognize the current US bankruptcy laws as 
potentially compromising to rights (Warren, 1987) and those who identify the issues of 
financialization in the housing market (Aalbers, 2016).  
Despite the trend of including finance, there persists a fundamental misunderstanding 
in the human rights literature of finance’s role in the macroeconomy. Each of these authors 
cited above identifies a rights-based issue with the modern economy and offer solutions 
without considering macro dynamics. The section will introduce the work of Dowell-Jones & 
Kinley periodically to highlight the absence of financial considerations at the macro level.  
This jump to micro-applications of human rights theory is premature. Financial 
inclusion at the individual level, for example, is crucial for individual wealth building and 
community development. Inclusion into a system with systemic tendency towards fragility and 
instability is, however, counterproductive. Ours is a macro-approach, by which the financial 
system and broader economy are monitored in the Minskian tradition for long-term stability, 
which ultimately fosters sustainable financial inclusion. The macro insight is similar to the 
micro-approach in that it recognizes credit as crucial for modern economic participation, which 
can include securing rights. The efficacy of credit to support rights is outside the scope of this 
paper and we do not argue against credit as an institution or against credit as an avenue to 
obtaining certain rights. The fundamental issue here is understanding the broader financial 
system and taking steps to make it compatible with policy in a rights framework.  
In its current form, the financial system touches everything from healthcare to 
education to shelter to retirement. If a developed country with a complex financial system 





system to prevent a financially-driven contraction. Individuals and communities are exposed 
to the risks associated contractions once they form a financial relationship with an 
intermediary. These relationships can be fostered directly (loans) or indirectly (pension funds, 
employment, etc.). Fragility can be detrimental to the maintenance of rights regardless of the 
relationship’s nature. An important issue in the current literature is loan issuance to an 
individual who is unqualified. It is a whole different issue – and the one focused on here – 
when there is a universal complacency in the financial sector which breeds systemic fragility 
and magnifies the negative effects of default.  
To effectively situate the rights solution suggested here, it is important to appreciate 
the existing literature and its shortcomings. The ideological disconnect between finance and 
rights literature is stressed in the following sub-sections. The first sub-section surveys the 
corporate rights framework, which emphasizes corporate social responsibility. The second 
focuses on individual financial relationships. Each attempt to solve the problems of the modern 
rights-finance relationship by suggesting changes to the existing apparatus. The issue is that 
the existing apparatus is not fully understood, which overlooks the fundamental challenge of 
financial fragility.  
4.3.2 Corporate Rights Framework 
The literature inspired by the corporate rights framework highlights the disconnect 
between finance and rights scholars in a very specific way. Much of this literature is inspired 
by the so-called Ruggie framework which stresses the importance of a rights-centric 
compliance structure for multinational corporations (Dowell-Jones & Kinley, 2012). This 






This particular micro-level framework considers the direct impact that financial 
relationships and business involvement have on rights. These frameworks are an outgrowth of 
the economic and social rights movement and relate more directly to the transmission of 
financial developments on the individual consumer – or client – level (United Nations; Swiss 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2004). One approach within this framework is to 
provide a rights-based compliance structure intended to hold financial actors accountable for 
their relationship to businesses. The motivations of the research are similar, in recognizing the 
need to “identify how social risk, particularly human rights risk, can be translated into a format 
that is digestible” and applicable to modern financial processes (Roca & Manta, 2010, p. 5). 
The ultimate focus is different than in the macro approach because it looks to identify the areas 
further down the business chain “where the financial services supplier potentially enables other 
business activities that abuse human rights” (Roca & Manta, 2010, p. 17). 
This work is critical in holding corporations, and the financiers who facilitate their 
business, accountable, but it neglects the broader macro dynamics that fuel structural fragility. 
Consumers remain at risk of losing their ability to bolster rights if responsible and sustainable 
businesses find their financial relationships deteriorating as bank balance sheets become 
increasingly illiquid. Frameworks like the environmental, social, and corporate governance 
standard (ESG) also miss this point. The UN spearheaded a financial sector initiative where it 
asked corporate and financial leaders for feedback concerning the implementation of 
regulations that require boardroom practices to align with ESG ideals. As is the case with many 
of these conversations, the private-sector participants stressed the importance of having a 
quantifiable rights framework to ensure continued client satisfaction (United Nations; Swiss 





investing is understandable in this environment of mass-consolidation and it is important to 
understand the mechanisms by which a transition process is possible.  
Directly appealing to businesses for stronger rights-resolve is important, but is 
incomplete without an appreciation for structural debt cycles. Dowell-Jones & Kinley (2012) 
argue that the financial repercussions of the most recent financial crisis are not fully understood 
if rights scholars understand finance exclusively through the lens of the Ruggie Framework. 
Arguing on an international scale, the authors maintain that the global finance system contains 
within it “the power and wherewithal to improve the lot of the world’s poor and marginalized,” 
(Dowell-Jones & Kinley, 2012, p. 217). These others take a positive approach to the ability of 
financial markets to empower individuals. While the broader argument against the narrow 
corporate rights frame, there space to improve Dowell-Jones & Kinley’s call to incorporate 
rights. 
The integration approach offered by Dowell-Jones & Kinley is similar to the 
individual-based rights finance framework. There is an abundance of work that advocates 
socially responsible and sustainable financing to individuals the same way that the previous 
work appeals to business financing. Instead of emphasizing the residual ways that individuals 
are affected by firms that lack a rights-framework, there exists a swath of authors concentrating 
on the direct relationships that financial institutions engage consumers. This approach targets 
unsavory lending practices, bankruptcy laws, and access to credit. We argue that this advocacy 
work is most directly related to the urgings of this paper, but with fundamental differences.  
4.3.3 Individual Rights Framework 
The subprime mortgage meltdown inspired literature on the ethicality of home loan practices 
leading up to 2007. The conversation around subprime practices constitutes what UNEP 





rights-based vs. profits-based economic framework (Hirsch & Morris, 2010). The evolution of 
this framework is crucial for this paper’s rights-based argument, but not in the context of direct 
loan origination. Hirsch & Morris introduce the questions surrounding ethics and law in 
response to the most recent credit crisis and ask compelling questions concerning the nature of 
the responsibilities of lenders who burdened clients with insurmountable levels of debt. 
 Organizations like the Center for Responsible Lending added to the censuring of BHCs 
and other loan origination institutions. These advocacy organizations charged lenders like 
Countrywide with abusing their power by employing tactics like predatory lending, selling 
dangerous products, and having weak government institutions, among other denunciations 
(CRL, 2007). These are damning charges and have a crucial place in advocacy circles. For 
example, around 90% of mortgages issued to subprime borrowers between 2004-2006 were 
adjustable rate (Kregel, 2008). This presented a severe retraction when interest rates, and thus 
repayment rates, increased and borrowers lacked the ability to repay. Those borrowers 
considered subprime were foreclosed on and sustained considerable damage to their ability to 
take loans on in the future. Most importantly for this paper, the lending habits of these loan 
originators made their balance sheets increasingly precarious, which regulators missed 
completely. 
 The rights-inspired literature spurred after the housing crisis is part of a longer tradition 
of client-level activism. There are many examples of this activism manifesting in the fight for 
affordable housing, affordable education, and affordable healthcare. A survey of this literature 
is another endeavor entirely as it is both expansive and tangential, in that most of these 





Relating more directly to the nature of a finance-rights relationship, however, is bankruptcy 
and the question of access to credit as a human right.  
 Bankruptcy can be crippling for consumers and holds a prominent place in the rights-
finance literature. The structure of bankruptcy policy is a vigorously debated topic in law 
(Warren, 1987; Baird, 1987; Flint, 1991). While most of these articles are too technical in 
scope there are important ideas in related law-focused papers that apply to this paper. One of 
the most pertinent is a paper published in 2001 which found that an estimated “half a million 
middle-class families turned to the bankruptcy courts for help following an illness or injury in 
1999” (Jacoby, Sullivan, & Warren, 2001, p. 377). Pardo & Lacey (2005) discuss the growing 
financial burden of student debt in the United States and the financial hardships that can 
accompany the debt. The technical mechanisms of bankruptcy are outside the scope of this 
paper, but the insights that these arguments provide are invaluable. Indeed, bankruptcy is seen 
by Jacoby, Sullivan, & Warren (2001) as a type of social safety net that prevents the complete 
financial collapse of individuals trying to secure rights like healthcare, education, and housing.  
 For the purposes of this paper, the most insightful aspect of the current rights-finance 
relationship to come from these law reviews is the fact that people must enter the credit system 
to sustain a certain standard of living. These studies were conducted on middle-class 
Americans who can more easily obtain credit because of their incomes. This raises an 
important question in the rights literature: should access to credit be considered a human right? 
 The argument in this literature hinges largely on wealth building and financial 
inclusion. As we have seen, however, credit plays a vital role in securing rights. If middle-class 
Americans rely on credit then surely US citizens in lower income brackets should have access 





argue that financial inclusion centers on access to credit markets. Yunus is most known for his 
work on microcredit in the international sphere (Yunus, 2004; Yunus, 2011)19. He wrote a 
paper in the aftermath of the financial crisis, arguing that “the theoretical framework of 
capitalism that is widely accepted today is a half-built structure” prone to poverty and lack of 
basic rights (Yunus, 2009). To bolster capitalism for social purpose, he argues that the global 
business should develop socially-oriented goals and should establish ways for poverty-stricken 
individuals to own some of these business, This, of course, implies access to credit to ensure 
long-term ownership. 
 There are others, however, who believe that credit should not be classified as a human 
right. Gershman & Morduch (2011) argue that credit access is an intervention that can bolster 
rights, but can dilute the urgency of other rights if elevated to universal standing. They also 
argue that credit can do more harm than good under certain circumstances, and reframe the 
access debate by focusing on combating discriminatory practices in credit markets (Gershman 
& Morduch, 2011). The debate around credit access is complex, but both sides acknowledge 
that credit is used by individuals to secure rights.  
 This debate has inspired others to argue that credit should be made safer through 
regulatory oversight. Bar-Gill and Warren’s (2008) comprehensive article outlines the 
shortcomings of current credit regulation and offer an alternative that creates a regulatory 
branch of an existing agency “like the FRB or FTC,” which wields more authority over 
consumer credit products (p. 98). The authors argue that regulators should scrutinize credit 
products with the same motivations that drive food and consumer good regulation. This is 
compatible with our approach with the suggestion of an additional regulatory body, and an 
                                                          





application of the indicator to household consumption. The approach is still based on the direct 
relationship between consumers and credit, however, which diverges from our approach.  
4.3.4  Minsky Integration 
A macro-level analysis of the rights-finance relationship provides a more holistic framework 
for combating fragility and the devastating effects that it can have on rights. Dowell-Jones and 
Kinley encapsulate our main criticism of the approaches outlined above: “the integration of 
[human rights and finance] has so far been shallow and narrowly focused around a few key 
areas that are most easily comprehensible to those without specialist financial knowledge” (p. 
183). In essence, the micro-level approach amounts to a patchwork system that does not 
account for the structural tendencies of finance.20 These client-level approaches have the 
potential to be effective, but will become sustainable once financial dynamic are understood 
and adopted by the human rights community. 
 In this context, we adopt a definition of human rights as, at their core, “fundamentally 
matters of welfare” (Dowell-Jones & Kinley, 2011, p. 184, note 5). This understanding of 
rights puts pressure on ‘Big Government’ to ensure that it provides for its people the basic 
necessities to flourish, in accordance with a country’s founding principles and international 
standards. Reconciling these two sets of ideals can be difficult and we will examine more 
carefully the history of the rights-finance relationship in the US in the next section. The 
responsibility is important to understand for our purposes here. 
 The US Census Bureau reports a 14.3% increase in Americans living under the poverty 
line in 2009 (Dowell-Jones & Kinley, 2011, p. 186). This dramatic increase coincided with the 
collapse of a financial system that held $1,100 trillion, 18 times world GDP, in notional 
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derivative exposure alone. Financial sector growth of this magnitude must be considered 
proactively by domestic government institutions on the macro-level. It is clear that the 
“exponential growth in the size of financial markets and the simultaneous increase in 
complexity have led to a system that is at its core remote from any inherent code of shared 
social values,” which is reflected in financial legislation (Wachenfield, Aizawa, & Dowell-
Jones, 2016). In the current political and academic environment, there exist “powerful 
tendencies in both the economic and human rights fields to oversimplify the complex notions 
in the other field,” with some scholars claiming an inherent incompatibility (Dowell-Jones & 
Kinley, 2011, p. 187). While we consider claims of incompatibility as bizarre, there are clear 
failings in both fields to understand and incorporate the ideals of the other. 
 This paper argues that finance is neglected in human rights literature because, among 
other issues, the technical jargon is a significant barrier that makes identifying pathways for 
integration difficult. The lack of human rights considerations in finance largely stems from the 
inability of financial decision makers to step outside of their training and identify other ways 
that ‘value’ can be created or qualified. For human rights to inject itself into the financial 
conversation, there must be an active effort to demystify the financial system and understand 
the macro mechanisms that can help change. There is much work to be done in reconciling the 
“linguistic incongruity” between the two fields, but we believe Minskian language is the 
perfect vehicle (Dowell-Jones & Kinley, 2012).  
 As discussed, the human rights literature focuses too narrowly on financial 
relationships and misses the broader macro picture. There is also too narrow a focus on 
instability as the point at which human rights should be considered. Dowell-Jones & Kinley 





processes of increasing risk and procyclicality as leading to a higher likelihood of instability. 
Instability, however, should not be the point at which policymakers start to recognize danger 
in the financial markets. The underlying driver of increased risk and procyclicality is stability. 
It is in times of economic growth that regulators should fortify rights.  
 Wachenfield, Aizawa, and Dowell-Jones (2016) propose a critical question for the 
nature of the rights finance relationship: who is the financial system designed for? (p. 25). As 
we have argued, financial relationships drive everyday life in the modern economy and are 
relied on by people everywhere to secure rights. Regulators must reorient themselves to 
understand the ways in which the financial system can be designed to bolster rights and curtail 
fragility. To augment rights in times of financial stability is to ensure the health of financial 
positions in large BHCs and other loan originators. With healthy balance sheets and minimized 
risk, regulators can work indirectly to safeguard livelihoods on a macro-scale. If we agree that 
the financial system should be designed for the best interest of the people, then we would do 
well to acknowledge that building fragility is an impending sign of possible rights impediment.  
4.4 Conclusion 
In the Minskian tradition, the discussion of human rights is couched in the responsibilities of 
Big Government. As long as people must depend on credit to finance rights, the govenmenr 
must ensure stable credit markets. Integrating capitalist dynamics and human rights 
considerations bestows unto government the responsibility to monitor fragility in the pursuit 
of adequate rights protections. If fragility manifests in a debt-deflation cycle, political 
institutions fail in rights terms. The most efficient way to employ the micro-based solutions 
surveyed above is to first stabilize the macroeconomy. The next section will outline our 









5.1 Introducing the Indicator 
To this point, the paper has developed a broad theoretical framework with Minskian 
applications in both the behavioral and human rights literature. Chapter 3 develops the 
emotional-Minskian framework. Understanding behavior at the macro-level allows 
policymakers and academics alike to explain capitalist structural dynamics at an institutional 
level. Emotional finance demonstrates that narratives are necessary for financing activity, 
which are driven by convictions derived from group ideas.  
 The integration of Minskian ideas into human rights theory may seem fanciful but we 
identify tangible avenues for intersection. The emotional-Minskian framework is utilized to 
provide a macro perspective of financial markets to human rights scholars. Current micro-
based rights literature neglects the importance of capitalist dynamics. An understanding of 
fragility and financial structures provide human rights theory with options beyond its current 
conceptual bounds.  
This section will introduce empirical analysis to Minsky’s margin of safety concept. 
Changes in safety margins indicate when moves into the three financing stages. Margins of 
safety refer to the liquidity of a BHC’s balance sheet. This translates directly to the level of 
portfolio safety with BHC holdings. As balance sheets become more illiquid investors who 





centers on the financial sector, we can also discern the safety of the credit markets. This 
analysis can be applied to the aggregate financial sector and to individual firms.  
The indicator has implications for the emotional-Minskian framework and for human 
rights. Equipped with the indicator, regulators can observe narrowing safety margins, which 
provides insight for the prevailing market sentiment. With enough time, regulators can fine-
tune the indicator to react to psychological drivers before the financial sector slips into Ponzi 
finance. Rights advocates can also use the indicator to call for ‘Big Government’ action. As 
the financial sector becomes increasingly fragile, the greater the change for infringement of 
rights.  
This chapter will first define the three distinct financing stages as Minsky does. These 
stages are observed in every phase of capitalism that Minsky identifies. The stages are more 
susceptible to riskiness, however, in the current money-manager phase, marked by the 
extensive consolidation of the most powerful financial institutions. Once the stages are 
identified, we will outline the strategy used to empirically analyze the shift in stages and the 
change in safety margins. Through historical trend analysis, gradations of financing positions 
are identified where firms (sectors) slip into riskier states of existing financing positions. This 
is not exactly a tipping point, but it sets the groundwork for future research. The most cogent 
findings will be presented, which motivate suggestions for operational approaches.  
5.2 Defining the Financing Stages and Margins of Safety 
 The three financing stages and the margins of safety concept are defined briefly in the 
Theoretical Framework. It is useful to reiterate and expand on those definitions here to 
incorporate them more explicitly into the indicator. Minsky argues that the three financing 





move from hedge to speculative to Ponzi, the firm (sector) becomes increasingly fragile. A 
firm (sector) is a hedge unit when “expected income cash flows are sufficient to meet all the 
payment commitments on the outstanding liabilities” (Minsky, 1986, p. 226).  
A move into speculative financing is characterized by the expectation that income will 
exceed payment commitments that mature in the longer term, but short term income will only 
cover interest (Minsky, 1986). Speculative finance involves maturity mismatch where long 
term positions are financed with short term debt. This paper extends Minsky’s idea that 
commercial banks are never in hedge positions due to the nature of financial institutions to 
BHCs (Minsky, 1986, p. 230). Minsky recognizes speculative financing as natural in the 
economic process, and as a financing regime that can have positive impacts on employment 
and investment. Speculative finance becomes dangerous, however, as stability persists and 
managers cling to overly optimistic narratives. 
Speculative finance becomes Ponzi finance as short-term interest expense cannot be 
met by available cash and debt must be issued to cover the cost (Minsky, 1986). As the 
proportion of Ponzi financed units increases in a sector, the chance of a debt deflation spiral 
dramatically increases. These Ponzi financed units become increasingly more dependent on 
macroeconomic conditions to ensure successful debt rollover. A shift in market confidence can 
trigger a debt-deflation spiral as firms are unable to meet their short-term obligations.  
An effective way to analyze the shift in financing regimes is to calculate the margins 
of safety. Minsky argues that business in the US economy “is carried on within a system of 
borrowing and lending based on margins of safety,” which makes an empirical analysis of 
safety margins all the more necessary (Minsky, 1986, p. 33). In times of stability and consistent 





in particular, can use growing levels of leverage without obstruction from regulators because 
of success demonstrated in the immediate past. This is especially true in a profits-based 
economic policy framework where policymakers place exorbitant faith in the ability of 
financial growth to drive well-being higher. This sentiment also confirms narratives 
constructed by investors and managers who see sustained success as an affirmation of 
investment decisions.  
The indicator uses the interest expense and interest income to measure cash flows over 
different periods as well as debt issuance and debt repayment to understand the ways in which 
BHCs debt composition changes. It supplements the changes in flows with a maturity 
mismatch calculation which demonstrates the gradual change in balance sheet composition. 
The next section will discuss methodology for compiling and analyzing data.   
5.3 Data and Methodology  
5.3.1 Data Sources  
The data used to observe safety margins is publicly available on regulator websites. Converting 
the data to uniform excel format across quarters is the most difficult part in the process. In 
developing this section, we constructed a multitude of datasets to find the most applicable 
filing information. First, we looked at Call Reports, required by the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), which collects balance sheet and income statement 
data on BHCs. This data is available through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) and FFIEC websites. Call Reports provide useful information on the composition of 
BHC assets and liabilities at the firm level. Call Reports document the balance sheets of 
commercial banks, which were gradually incorporated into BHCs as the money-manager 





Performance Report (UBPR), which aggregates the Call Report data by asset level was 
considered. We focused on the largest asset class, which the FFIEC deems as BHCs with at 
least $10 billion of assets.  
The FR Y-9C filings that BHCs must submit to the Federal Reserve were also surveyd. 
These filings provide similar information to the Call Reports, but are available at an 
institutional level, which makes manipulation more feasible. The issues with these three 
datasets are the lack of cash flow information and the date constraints, with each set going back 
to 2001. While these datasets were useful to understand the changing nature of BHC balance 
sheets, it did not give us the full picture. Since Minsky identifies financing stages in both stock 
and flow terms, we looked for a dataset that included cash flow information. In the interest of 
observing trends across multiple business cycles, data with longer time-horizons is necessary. 
This led us to the Chicago Fed website21 where the FR Y-9C and FR Y-9LP data is 
reported quarterly in the same data file. Some of the balance sheet data reported in the FR Y-
9C dates to 1986. The analysis at 1990, however, because that is when the FR Y-9LP reports 
include cash flow statements for BHC parent companies. To obtain the data, one must 
download the zipped files by quarter and convert them from .txt to .xls format. We mention 
this because it is a strenuous process that can impede future research. The Chicago Fed should 
make the data more accessible to allow greater ease of access for students and academics.  
5.3.2 Methodology 
 To analyze the data, we pull the relevant information from each quarterly spreadsheet 
into a primary spreadsheet for manipulation. The analysis begins with the aggregate financial 
sector analysis. The next stage of analysis narrows the data to the top-10 financial institutions, 
                                                          





as measured by total assets.22 The narrower scope allows for analysis in a consolidated market 
that is vastly different than the one that Minsky writes about in 1986. The data manipulation 
process is consistent, since the same variables and techniques are used regardless of analysis 
scope. For the aggregate and top-10 analysis, we sum all of the values reported for each data 
point. This allows us to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the growth of the financial 
sector as well as the largest banks. Since the data is sorted by total assets, the names of the 
largest banks change throughout the analysis. We are not focused on the sway of one 
institution, but rather the influence that industry leaders have on the broader sector.  
 The first analytical point focuses on the ‘maturity mismatch.’ A BHC has a maturity 
mismatch on its balance sheet as long term assets are financed increasingly by short term 
liabilities. This becomes problematic when market confidence shifts and BHCs must repay 
outstanding debts. In a debt deflation cycle, the prices of long term assets fall, which makes it 
more difficult to meet short term debt obligations. To calculate maturity mismatch, we use the 
definitions of “long term assets” and “short term debt” as expressed in the UBPR 
Supplementary Manual (2014). Short term liabilities is divided by long term assets to create a 
ratio that represents maturity mismatch. Long term assets are total loans and leases net of 
unearned income, debt securities maturity in over one year, equity securities, and real estate 
owned23. Short term debt are borrowings with remaining maturities of one year or less, 
including commercial paper. A list of the exact data used can be found in Appendix A.  
 The other crucial aspect in identifying financing stages is cash flow. The flow data 
reported in the FR Y-9LP is a point of intent focus. This data demonstrates the ability of BHCs 
                                                          
22 Due to time and data constraints, an analysis at the individual firm level is left for further research. The 
process by which individual data can be used with the indicator is included in Appendix B.  






to meet their contractual obligations. The main data trends are derived using the total interest 
income and total interest expense. The relationship between these two flows provides an 
understanding of ability of banks to pay their obligations. At the firm level, interest income 
represents the income earned on loans and securities held, while expense represents obligations 
to investors who hold debt issued by the firm. The total sum each reporting BHC’s total interest 
income and total interest expense is used for the aggregate analysis. In addition to interest 
income and expense, we include the total debt issued and total debt repaid by each bank. It is 
difficult to know the proportion of BHC debt that is held by other BHCs, but we do know that 
the sector is very interconnected, which can cause ripple effects when defaults occur.  
 To detect trends, we use basic analytical techniques like year-over-year percent change 
and simple division. It would be outside of the Minskian tradition to employ complex 
mathematical methods that would rely on a battery of assumptions. Instead we utilize simpler 
techniques to analyze fundamental changes in liquidity and cash flow. This allows for constant 
regulator supervision to ensure that BHCs do not exceed certain levels of illiquidity or lag 
behind in their payment commitments. The preceding sections relay the findings and 
explanations on the aggregate level and for the top-10 institutions. 
5.4 Indicator and Findings  
5.4.1 Two Measures of Safety Margins 
The aggregate and top-10 findings provide insight for constructing two empirical measures for 
the margins of safety concept. The first focuses on the comparative rates of growth for interest 
expense and interest income. This first measure focuses on flows and ability to meet debt 








using quarterly data where IE is interest expense and q is the specified quarter. The same 
equation if used to calculate the interest income by replacing IE with II.  








BHCs are approaching Ponzi finance. BHCs are assumed to start as speculative finance units 
since and can never be considered hedge. We hesitate to characterize any relationship observed 
by this definition as a definitive tipping point into Ponzi financing. Even as growth rates of IE 
increase at a greater rate than II growth, the interest ratio suggests that BHCs are able to meet 
payment commitments. The interest expense and interest income data are not sufficient in for 
identifying tipping points because BHCs’ loan portfolios are extremely complex. It is fair to 
argue, however, that as IE growth outpaces II, BHCs ability to meet cash commitments is 
increasingly compromised. The last part of this section will briefly discuss ways to improve 
the indicator. 
 The second measure calculates the spread between the Interest Ratio and the Debt Ratio 








The spread is important because it expresses the stress place on BHCs as their Interest Ratio 
falls. A declining spread indicates that the Debt Ratio exceeds the Interest Ratio which implies 
a rising debt burden with decreasing ability to pay. We suggest that a negative spread may 





suggestion is the fact the spread has been positive since Q3-2009. A positive spread does not 
necessarily suggest a safe balance sheet. Indeed, high spreads are a function of the interest rate. 
Spreads that are inflated due to low interest rate environments may disguise growing fragility. 
Continued monitoring using this method will demonstrate the degree of fragility as interest 
rates rise. 
 At this point, we hesitate to fully endorse the indicator’s ability to identify distinct 
tipping points. The indicator does, however, effectively identify increasingly risky positions 
within speculative finance. This insight provides gradations within financing positions, which 
emphasizes the nuance that exists within each financing stage.  
  Future research on empirical safety margin analysis can include elements from more 
recent reporting requirements that were developed in response to the Great Recession. This 
includes more granular information on balance sheet composition, like risk weighted capital 
and precise reporting of derivative exposure. This data exists sporadically throughout the 
timeframe analyzed here and do not offer insights into the dynamics expressed in reported data 
across multiple cycles. The indicator in its current form substantiates the margin of safety 
concept in the long run. Some findings on the aggregate and top-10 levels will now be 
analyzed. 
5.4.2 Aggregate Fragility  
The data shows clear trends in the BHC balance sheet composition and the cash flow 
relationships in times leading up to crisis. The findings presented in this section will first 
establish the changes in balance sheet composition on the aggregate level. From there, cash 
flow data will be analyzed. Once fragility in the aggregate is understood, the influence from 





financial contraction that affected the US economy directly and the light shading represents 
periods that briefly influenced the financial sector like the Asian Financial Crisis and the Long 
Term Capital Management collapse. 
 Error! Reference source not found. shows the aggregate maturity mismatch of BHC 
balance sheets between Q3-1990 and Q4-2016. The time series demonstrates the proportion of 
short term debt to long term liabilities, peaking from Q2-2000 to Q4-2000 before the 2001 
crash and Q3-2008 during the most recent financial crisis. On the liabilities side, the 
fluctuations are primarily drive by changes in commercial paper and money borrowed set to 
mature within the year of the reporting date. The most influential assets are net loans and leases 
and securities maturing in five years or more.  
 These trends follow the Minskian intuition that financial institutions actively finance 
long-term asset accumulation by issuing short term debt. The also demonstrate an increased 
willingness to lend in times of expansions. In each of the most recent crises banks had to 
liquidate a high proportion of long term assets, driven by severe declines in net loans and 
leases. The average year-on-year (YoY) percent growth for net loans and leases over this 
timeframe is 5.9%. The average YoY growth in the eight quarters leading up to the Dot com 





crash in Q1-2001 was 18.7%, with rates slowing to as low as 0.97% during the contraction. 
BHCs began to recognize danger as early as Q1-2006, almost two years before Q4-2007, the 
reported start date of the recession,24 with an average growth rate of -30.7%. The loss of net 
loan and leases on the balance sheet has a significant impact on interest income.  
 Figure 3 shows the relationship between the interest ratio – defined as total interest 
income over total interest expense – and the one-year Treasury bond interest rate. The bond is 
reported as a percentage and appears on the figure as a decimal. The short term interest rate 
has demonstrable influence on the Interest Ratio (Ennis, Fessenden, & Walter, 2016). The 
spread between the Interest Ratio and short term interest rate may mask growing illiquidity of 
BHC balance sheets. The maturity mismatch, as calculated above, remains low, but the 
composition could change dramatically as interest rates rise. 
                                                          
24 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee.  





 Understanding the relationship between balance sheet composition and the Interest 
Ratio enables an informed use of the indicator. Figure 4 expresses the first element of the 
indicator. The results show that in times preceding crises, the growth of interest expense 
outpaces that of interest economy. This relationship exists in Q3-1994, which may be explained 
by the Tequila crisis. Notice the period between Q4-2004 and Q2-2006 where interest income 
and interest expense had similar negative growth rates. This was probably an early indication 
of financial stress. The curve relationship does not have an inflection point until Q4-2007, 
however, which is when the magnitude of financial distress manifested. It is important to 
acknowledge that interest expense declines rapidly during crises, which is likely a function of 
asset liquidation. 
 The growth relationship between interest expense and interest income offers some 
insight into the ability of banks to cover cash commitments. This insight is bolstered in Error! 
Reference source not found., which illustrates the spread relationship that is expressed in the 
second element of the indicator. The spread between the Interest and Debt ratios goes negative 
in the quarters preceding crisis, suggesting that the indicator is effective in demonstrating 





increased fragility. In addition to the spread, Figure 5 includes the YoY percent change of short 
term debt accumulated by BHCs. There exists a generally inverse relationship between the 
two, suggesting that as the Interest Ratio falls (income declining more than expense), BHCs 
must issue debt (increasing Debt Ratio), which is supplemented by short term liabilities. Figure 
5, in tandem with Figure 4, illustrate the relationship between cash flows and balance sheet 
composition. While tipping points cannot be identified conclusively, there is a clear 
representation of increased fragility.  
5.4.3 Top-10 Financial Institutions 
The top-10 financial institutions change overtime, due to consolidation and innovation. We 
identify the top-10 financial institutions by asset class in each reporting period. This allows for 
a dynamic analysis that shifts with the asset concentration. The same methodologies are 
employed for the top-10 institutions as in the aggregate analysis. This sub-section will briefly 
discuss the differences between the top-10 institutions and the aggregate financial sector. 
 Figure 6 compares the maturity mismatch among the top-10 financial institutions to the 
aggregate sector. Top-10 financial institutions have a larger proportion of short term liabilities 





to long term assets than does the rest of the sector. This suggests that the top-10 institutions 
drive innovation and the adoption of new financial instruments that may not be reported to or 
understood by regulators (Nersisyan & Wray, 2010). Since assets are so heavily concentrated 
on the balance sheets of these outsized institutions, an adverse move in market sentiment can 
create an environment of instability in the broader sector. 
 Error! Reference source not found. illustrates the YoY percent change in interest 
expense and interest income for the top-10 BHCs. This relationship is similar to the one 
observed in the aggregate. While the inflection points occur at similar time periods, the rates 
of both growth and decline appear sharper than the rates in the aggregate. The decline in 
interest expense and interest income between Q4-2004 and Q2-2006 are not quite as dramatic 
as that observed in the aggregate. This could be a reason as to why the manifestation of the 
increasingly fragility did not occur until Q4-2007 as the curves reached an inflection point. 
This suggests that fragility among the top-10 institutions drives aggregate sector fragility.  
  
 





Figure 8 expresses the spread relationship and the YoY percent change in short term 
liabilities for top-10 institutions. Again, the top-10 institutions appear to drive fragility in the 
aggregate. Particularly interesting in this graph is the magnitude of short term debt growth. In 
Q1-1999, for example, the peak YoY growth for top-10 institutions tops 80%. The 
corresponding peak in the aggregate analysis occurs in Q4-1999 and is around 49%. This 
suggests that the largest institutions rely more heavily on short term debt, as discovered in the 
maturity mismatch analysis, and that the largest institutions have the ability to move the sector.  
Figure 8: Top-10 Year-over-Year % Change in Interest Expense and Interest Income 
Figure 7: Top-10 Interest Ratio - Debt Ratio (Spread) and Year-over-Year 





 The findings generated with the indicator provide insights for BHC moves into 
fragility. It is not argued that explicit tipping points can be identified, but a shift into increasing 
fragility can be observed. The relationship between top-10 financial institutions and the 
aggregate financial sector is as expected, with consolidation at the upper levels of asset classes 
perpetuating fragility.  
 Use of the indicator has been alluded to repeatedly throughout this paper. With the 
elements of the indicator explicitly stated, regulators can utilize the indicator as a policy tool. 
The indicator’s findings can be partially explained by the emotional-Miskian framework. As 
the spread relationship moves negative, for example, regulators can understand the prevailing 
market narratives. This allows for responsible policy measures to curb fragility without jolting 
markets. Rights advocates can also utilize the indicator to understand macro dynamics and 
promote sensible rights-focused action. The use of the indicator is a step toward long-term 





















This paper has extended the theoretical foundations of Minsky’s financial fragility hypothesis 
to include psychological elements and human rights motivations. The difficulty in presenting 
the emotional-Minskian framework as a viable alternative is the established belief of rationality 
in the financial marketplace. This is a headwind to the framework on both economic and 
behavioral fronts. Continued work to amend existing behavioral paradigms with the emotional-
Minskian framework would do well to provide a more holistic and representative 
understanding of the macroeconomy as it presently operates. 
 Human rights scholars are close to effectively integrating rights and finance, but must 
reexamine their analytical scope. Minskian theory provides a unique way of understanding 
financial markets and their relationship to the real economy, which encourages the 
incorporation of rights-ideas. Perhaps most important in the Minskian framework is the 
recognition of credit (and debt) as central to economic functioning. In an era when rights are 
entangled at every stage with continued market stability, human rights scholars, and those they 
advocate for, benefit from this understanding. 
In developing this broad theoretical framework, an indicator to monitor financial 
fragility is advanced. The development of the indicator is important. With increasingly 
granular financial data available at the firm and sector levels, the indicator would benefit from 
more sophisticated construction. We have demonstrated that the changes in safety margins can 
be discerned from financially reported data. There are baselines established in this paper that 






Minskian insights should be limited to economics and finance. While their foundation 
will always reside under the broader umbrella of the ‘dismal science,’ we have taken steps to 
apply his insights along broader theoretical lines. We hope that this broader theory of financial 
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Data Name Data Code in Spreadsheet Filing Report 
Total Assets BHCK2170 FR Y 9-C 
Total Interest Income BHCK4107 FR Y 9-C 
Total Interest Expense BHCK4073 FR Y 9-C 
Commercial Paper BHCK2309 FR Y 9-C 
Other Borrowed Money Maturing 
in Less Than One Year 
BHCK2332 FR Y 9-C 
Debt Maturing in Less Than One 
Year 
BHCK6555 FR Y 9-C 
Total Loans & Leases, Net of 
Unearned Income 
BHCK2122 FR Y 9-C 
Securities Maturing in 1-5 Years BHCK0384 FR Y 9-C 
Securities Maturing in 5+ Years BHCK0387 FR Y 9-C 
Other Real Estate Owned BHCK2150 FR Y 9-C 
All Other Off-Balance Sheet 
Liabilities 
BHCK3430 FR Y 9-C 
Noninterest Income BHCK4079 FR Y 9-C 
Loans Secured by Real Estate BHCK1410 FR Y 9-C 
Cash Flows from Financing: 
Issuance of Debt 
BHCP6600 FR Y 9-LP 
Cash Flows from Financing: 
Repayment of Debt 
BHCP6604 FR Y 9-LP 
Cash & Cash Equivalents BHCP6775 FR Y 9-LP 
 
Precise definitions for each data point exist on the Federal Reserve Board’s Micro Data 











Excel Code  
The following code demonstrates how the data is pulled from the data files for each quarter 
once the data is converted into .xls format as discussed above. Each file is sorted manually by 
reported total assets in descending order.  
Aggregate Fragility 
The SUM INDEX MATCH function is used as follows: 
=SUM(INDEX(‘[Quarterly Data File.xls]Sheet1’!$A$1:$DDD$6000,0,MATCH(“Data Code”, ‘[Quarterly Data 
File.xls]Sheet1’!$A$1:$DDD$1,0))) 
Once the data for each code is summed, the values are copied and pasted into a different spreadsheet that populates 
the data as values, disposing of the cumbersome formula. Notice the large range in the lookup_range syntax. This 
accommodates the varied columns that the a given Data Code can be found as reporting standards change.  
Top-10 Fragility 
The SUM INDEX MATCH function is used as follows: 
=SUM(INDEX(‘[Quarterly Data File.xls]Sheet1’!$A$1:$DDD$11,0,MATCH(“Data Code”, ‘[Quarterly Data 
File.xls]Sheet1’!$A$1:$DDD$1,0))) 
The code is very similar to the aggregate fragility code. The only difference is the smaller lookup_range syntax, 
which narrows the operation to the top-10 institutions.  
Firm Fragility 
The INDEX MATCH MATCH function can be used as follows: 
=INDEX(‘[Quarterly Data File.xlsx]Sheet1'!$A$1:$DDD$6000,MATCH("Name of Institution",' [Quarterly 
Data File.xls]Sheet1'!$A$1:$A$6000,0),MATCH("Data Code",[Quarterly Data 
File.xlsx]Sheet1'!$A$1:$DDD$1,0)) 
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